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HOW A SPOUSE CAN PROFIT BY PAYING
PARTNER’S PRINCIPAL
Steven J. Willis

PRÉLUDE
Consider a counter-intuitive scenario:
Before marriage, A purchases a financed house in which the
spouses subsequently reside. Later, B desires a divorce, but has not
told A. Substantial debt remains encumbering the house. In most
cases – regardless whether marital/community funds serviced the
debt – B should pay A’s debt using marital/community assets, even
if B must borrow to do so. Indeed, in many cases, B should use
separate property to pay A’s debt!
States, courts, and academics have long wrestled with the separatehouse/separate-debt serviced-by-marital-funds scenario.1 While many have
recognized existing formula flaws, none have proposed a workable solution.2 This
article does.3 As it also demonstrates, often a non-owner-spouse can generate an
enormous profit from deceiving his/her owner-spouse.4 In California and Florida,5
all it takes is “Honey, I love you . . . let me pay your debt.” Who would not fall for
that? Read on, with the hope that you will not.
Many state property division formulas deal with debt payments, but none
properly consider the financial, accounting, and economic consequences. Sometimes


Steven J. Willis, Professor of Law, University of Florida Levin College of Law. Florida Bar active
member; Louisiana Bar member (inactive); Louisiana CPA (inactive).
1. BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY 381–96 (Thomson/West eds., 3d ed.
2005) (discussing various state allocation formulas).
2. This article analyzes nineteen states, none of which consistently deals with the issues in an
economically fair manner: California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Texas, and Virginia.
3. Others propose solutions different from the one proposed herein. See generally David L. Manz,
The Marital Share of Passive Appreciation of Nonmarital Property: Deconstructing Kaaa for a Better
Solution, 87-FEB FLA. B.J. 38 (2013) (proposing what became the 2018 Florida Statute) [hereinafter
Manz]; Brett R. Turner, Allocation Formulas, Interest on Mortgages, and Joint Loans: A Critique of
Keeling v. Keeling, 18 No. 3 DIVORCE LITIG. 37 (2006) (proposing that states consider interest payments,
but without proposing a specific method to do so) [hereinafter Turner]; Lisa Milot, Accounting for Time:
A Relative-Interest Approach to the Division of Equity in Hybrid-Property Homes Upon Divorce, 100 KY.
L.J. 585, 595 (2012) (criticizing courts for failing to consider timing, and proposing a complicated
solution).
4. See infra Tables 18 demonstrating a plausible non-owner spouse return of 532.81%.
5. Plus, New Mexico. The manipulation would also work to a lesser extent in Kentucky, Virginia,
North Carolina, Maryland, Missouri, Georgia, and Delaware. See infra Tables 16–19.
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a state achieves a fair result, but more by happenstance than because of a valid
economic formula. Often, state formulas reward bad decisions and punish good ones.
Some are easily manipulated by devious (well-advised?) spouses.
This article suggests an Economic Reimbursement Formula for most6
separate debts paid with marital funds. A spouse would owe reimbursement for the
payment of separate liabilities – both interest and principal – equal to the present
value of prior payments. This proposal differs from existing formulas in multiple
ways:





It considers both interest and principal.
It considers the timing of payments.
It provides a reasonable return to the non-debtor spouse,
using a predictable measure.
It applies to secured and unsecured loans.

Additionally, the proposed formula could apply to the opposite situation:
non-marital funds enhancing marital assets.7 The focus of the article, however, rests
on the payment of separate liabilities with marital/community funds.
Replying in advance to anticipated concerns:





Computations and record-keeping would be simple.8
Including interest will not result in unreasonable
numbers; indeed, the results will be similar to many
current court-imposed results, but without the potential
distortions current formulas inherently include.9
Including the “return on investment” – which considers
the timing of each payment – is neither complex nor
unreasonable in amount.10

This Article has five parts:
I.
BACKGROUND: This includes an overview of issues and nineteen
state formulas. It explains the fundamental flaw of each formula – the failure to
consider the payments’ timing and interest components. It also explains why some
shared costs do not enter the formulas. Finally, it excludes some issues for later
discussion.
II.
ILLUSTRATIONS: This computational part covers three common
scenarios. One assumes an owner-spouse enters the marriage with a highly6. The proposal excludes child support and alimony from nonmarital debts prompting
reimbursement. Including them would not change the economic analysis; however, states considering the
proposed statute should consider whether to include those common separate obligations.
7. E.g., In re Marriage of Lucas, 614 P.2d 285 (Cal. 1980) (separate assets paying community debt);
In re Marriage of Moore, 618 P.2d 208 (Cal. 1980) (community funds paying separate debt).
8. One must know six values: date-of-marriage debt, date-of-divorce debt, monthly payment
amount, number of payments during the marriage, date-of-marriage house value, and date-of-divorce
house value. The first three would typically be a matter of public record (assuming the secured note is
filed) or could be easily computed from the note. The length of the marriage and the date-of-divorce value
would be in the divorce filing. The date-of-marriage property value could be a contested issue, but that is
the case under most existing formulas.
9. See infra Tables 1 through 11.
10. Id.; see infra note 154.
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leveraged11 house, the second assumes he/she enters with a low-leveraged house, and
the third assumes an extremely highly-leveraged house. Each scenario considers
three examples. The first owner-spouse made a “bad” investment: financing costs
exceed the house appreciation. The second made a neutral investment: financing
costs equals the appreciation. The third made a “good” investment: house
appreciation exceeds the financing costs.
III.
OBSERVATIONS: Here, the article compares nineteen states –
grouped into eight formulas – plus the proposed formula. No examined formula
consistently reaches a fair result, in which the non-owner-spouse receives a return
approximating to the house appreciation. Indeed, most examined formulas
shortchange the non-owner-spouse in a “bad-investment” scenario, but overcompensate him/her in a “good-investment” scenario. Those results are the opposite
of what should occur because they reward the owner-spouse for a bad investment
and punish the owner-spouse for a good investment.
IV.
PROPOSAL: This part proposes a statute which would compensate
a non-owner-spouse with a return equal to the house appreciation, if any.
V.
CONCLUSION: All states should adopt the proposal. At least, the
nineteen surveyed states should do so.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

General

Many states consider the payment of secured separate debts with marital
funds as creating a marital/community asset.12 A few apply their rules to unsecured
debts as well.13 States typically consider only the debt principal and none14 consider
the timing of the payment. Most formulas fit into two general categories:
 Appreciation Formula. Many states use a “source of funds rule”15 under
which a portion of the secured asset becomes marital. States vary regarding
the portion of appreciation considered, but such approaches share common
flaws: they fail to the consider interest or timing.

11. “Leverage” typically refers to a debt to asset ratio. A $100,000 asset subject to $80,000 of debt,
is 80% leveraged. Subject to $30,000 debt, the same house would be 30% leveraged. Debt divided by
equity is another leverage ratio; however, though it provides the same information as debt to assets, the
numbers differ and are less used in relation to residences.
12. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.075(10) (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 26th Legis., 2019);
Moore, 618 P.2d at 209–10 (Cal. 1980); Anthony v. Anthony, 355 Pa. Super. 589, 514 A.2d 91, 94–95
(1986); In re Marriage of Reeser, 635 P.2d 930, 933 (Col. App. 1981).
13. E.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §3.402(a) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of the 86th
Legis.); LA. CIV. CODE art. 2364 (West, Westlaw through 2018 3d Extraordinary Sess.).
14. The author has found no states which consider the timing issues, although Nevada courts have
asserted that they do. See, Malmquist v. Malmquist, 792 P.2d 372, 377–79 (Nev. 1990).
15. Harper v. Harper, 448 A.2d 916, 929 (Md. 1982); Brett R. Turner, Virginia’s Equitable
Distribution Law: Active Appreciation and the Source of Funds Rule, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
879 (1990).
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Partial Reimbursement. Several states use a reimbursement approach,16
but each considers only principal and none consider timing. As a result,
each fails to fully reimburse the non-debtor spouse.

B. State Specific Focus
Focusing on eight approaches (two from California17 and two from
Florida ) provides a broad picture of what states do.
 California uses an appreciation formula. Interestingly, it has two versions
of the rule: In re Marriage of Lucas19 and In re Marriage of Moore.20 New
Mexico21 follows Moore. Also, a 2018 Florida statute uses the Moore
formula, although the legislative history has no Moore citation.
 Kentucky22 uses a well-articulated appreciation formula, which Virginia,23
North Carolina,24 Maryland, 25 Missouri,26 Georgia,27 and Delaware28
follow. This formula focuses on the date-of-divorce house equity.
 Nevada,29 using a modified California Moore formula, treats house
appreciation as marital to the extent of original leverage.
 Maine30 and Minnesota31 have an unusual “source of funds” rule, which is
identical to the Nevada formula, at least when the house is purchased shortly
prior to the marriage.
18

16. E.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2364; Vanwassenhove v. Vanwassenhove, 998 P.2d 505, 506 (Idaho
App. 2000); In re Marriage of Ford, 879 N.E.2d 335, 339, 341 (Ill App. 3d 2007) (recognizing the
reimbursement obligation for separate principal payments from marital funds, but offset by any marital
benefit, such as use of the property); cf. In re Marriage of Philip, No. 32041–3–III, 2014 WL 6602003, at
*9–14 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2014) (discussing reimbursement for using community funds to pay a
separate obligation, subject to an offset if the community benefitted, and discretionary in amount if the
secured property appreciated).
17. California uses one formula for separate funds paying community debt but a very different
formula for community funds paying separate debts. Arguably, states should treat the two situations the
same.
18. Florida has a 2018 statutory formula which replaced an often-criticized Florida Supreme Court
formula. Because both formulas are flawed, understanding both helps one to understand the flaws.
19. In re Marriage of Lucas, 614 P.2d 285 (Cal. 1980) (separate funds paying community debt).
20. In re Marriage of Moore, 618 P.2d 208 (Cal. 1980) (community funds paying separate debt).
21. Dorbin v. Dorbin, 731 P.2d 959, 963 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
22. Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d 871, 872 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
23. Hart v. Hart, 497 S.E.2d 496, 505 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (adopting the Kentucky Brandenburg
formula); Martin v. Martin, 501 S.E.2d 450, 454 (Va. Ct. App. 1998) (re-affirming use of the Brandenburg
formula, but stressing it was optional); see also, Duva v. Duva, 685 S.E.2d 842, 849 (Va. Ct. App. 2009)
(rejecting the “source of funds” rule).
24. Willis v. Willis 358 S.E.2d 571, 572–73 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987); see Sally Burnett Sharp, The
Partnership Ideal: The Development of Equitable Distribution in North Carolina, 65 N.C. L. REV. 195,
207 (1987) (discussing the North Carolina “source of funds” rule).
25. Harper v. Harper, 448 A.2d 916, 929–30 (Md. 1981).
26. Selby v. Selby 149 S.W.3d 472, 483–84 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004).
27. Thomas v. Thomas, 377 S.E.2d 666, 669–70 (Ga. 1989).
28. S.E.T. v. L.T., 2008 WL 2897371, at *21–22 (Del. Fam. Ct. May 16, 2008).
29. Malmquist v. Malmquist, 792 P.2d 372, 377–79 (Nev. 1990).
30. Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70, 76–77 (Me. 1979).
31. Schmitz v. Schmitz, 309 N.W.2d 748, 750 (Minn. 1981).
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Florida used a widely-criticized32 formula33 before replacing it with a 2018
statute.34 It has a long history struggling with the issue, resulting in four
major changes in nine years.
Texas,35 and Louisiana,36 have a partial reimbursement statute addressing
the issue. Idaho37 has similar case law.
Pennsylvania38 and Colorado39 use a simple appreciation formula: all
appreciation in separate assets is marital.
Illinois40 has a “transmutation” assumption which courts frequently
overcome.41
a.

California (Lucas/Moore/Aufmuth)

California uses two contribution formulas which are a function of property
appreciation. They arose from three California cases, the 1980 Supreme Court
decisions in Moore42 and Lucas,43 as well as the earlier Aufmuth appellate decision.44
Lucas and Aufmuth are consistent, but Moore is radically different; nevertheless, the
Moore Court quoted, and “adopted”45 the Lucas/Aufmuth formula, with some
modifications. The cases differ in that Aufmuth/Lucas involved the use of separate
assets to purchase a community home, while Moore had the opposite facts:
community funds used to pay a debt secured by a separate home. Whether those facts
should alter the algebraic formula is debatable.
Aufmuth considered spouses who purchased a $65,500 house four years
after they married. Wife contributed $16,500 of separate funds and the parties
together borrowed $50,000. During the marriage, community funds reduced the loan

32. MANZ, supra note 3; FLA. S. JUDICIARY COMM., B. ANALYSIS AND FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT,
CS/SB 752, at 4 (2012) (hereinafter 2012 BILL ANALYSIS).
33. Kaaa vs. Kaaa, 58 So. 3d 867, 872–73 (Fla. 2010).
34. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.075(10) (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 26th Legis., 2019).
35. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.402 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of the 86th Legis.).
36. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2364 (West, Westlaw through 2018 3d Extraordinary Sess.).
37. Vanwassenhove v. Vanwassenhove, 998 P.2d 505, 506 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000).
38. Anthony v. Anthony, 514 A.2d 91, 94–95 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
39. In re Marriage of Reeser, 635 P.2d 930, 933 (Colo. App. 1981).
40. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/503(c)(1) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-6 of the 2019 Reg.
Sess.); see Brett R. Turner, Unlikely Partners: The Marital Home and the Concept of Separate Property,
20 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 69, 81–84 (2006) (discussing “unitary property” in Virginia and Illinois
as well as describing and criticizing the Illinois formula).
41. See James H. Feldman and Charles J. Fleck, Taming Transmutation: A Guide to Illinois’ New
Rules on Property Classification and Division upon Dissolution of Marriage, 72 ILL. B.J. 336 (1984)
(discussing a 1982 change in Illinois law providing reimbursement as a likely alternative to
transmutation).
42. In re Marriage of Moore, 618 P.2d 208, 209–10 (Cal. 1980).
43. In re Marriage of Lucas, 614 P.2d 285 (Cal. 1980).
44. In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979), overruled on other grounds
by Lucas, 614 P.2d 285.
45. “Although many formulae have been suggested, we are not persuaded that any of them would be
an improvement over a formula based on the reasoning of In re Marriage of Aufmuth (1979) 89
Cal.App.3d 446, 152 Cal.Rptr. 668, which was approved in In re Marriage of Lucas (1980) 27 Cal.3d
808. . . .” Moore, 618 P.2d at 211.
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to $47,000, while the house appreciated to $125,000.46 The trial court, affirmed by
the appellate court, held the wife had a separate property interest because of her
down-payment:
“[T]he present value of the $16,500 initial investment in said residence is
$31,014 and the present value of the joint investment is $46,986.” Although not
expressly stated, it is apparent that the court calculated the $31,014 figure by adding
the amount of capital appreciation attributable to separate funds (24.81 percent of
$58,500) to the amount of the equity paid by separate funds ($16,500); the $46,986
figure, by adding the amount of capital appreciation attributable to community funds
(75.19 percent of $58,500) to the amount of equity paid by community funds
($50,000 minus $47,000).47
Algebraically, that formula is:
48

CA= Community asset.
V1 = Date-of-acquisition value of community home.
V2 = Date-of-separation value of community home.
D1 = Date-of-acquisition secured debt.
D2 = Date-of-separation secured debt.
In 1980 Lucas, adopted the Aufmuth formula49 with a clear example:
[Consider] a house purchased for $100,000, with the wife paying
the entire down payment of $20,000 from separate property funds
and the community contributing the rest of the purchase price in
the amount of a loan for $80,000. There would be a 20 percent
separate property interest and an 80 percent community property
interest in the house. Assume that the fair market value of the
house at the time of trial is $175,000 resulting in a capital
appreciation of $75,000, and the mortgage balance at the time of
separation was $78,000. The value of the separate property interest
would be $35,000, which represents the amount of capital
appreciation attributable to the separate funds (20 percent of
$75,000) added to the amount of equity paid by separate funds
($20,000). The net value of the community property interest would
be $62,000, which represents the amount of capital appreciation
attributable to community funds (80 percent of $75,000) added to
the amount of equity paid by community funds ($80,000 minus
$78,000).50

46. Aufmuth, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
47. Id.
.

48. $46,986

,
,

125,000

66,500

50,000

49. In re Marriage of Lucas, 614 P.2d 285, 289 (Cal. 1980).
50. Id. at 290, n.3.

47,000 .
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Lucas rested on a presumption regarding separate funds used in a
community acquisition, specifically whether the funds were a gift and how a party
might overcome the presumption.51 The California Legislature later changed the
Lucas presumption,52 as well as the formula. For community acquisitions,
reimbursement for separate property enhancement includes no appreciation:
[T]he party shall be reimbursed for the party’s contributions to the
acquisition of property of the community property estate to the
extent the party traces the contributions to a separate property
source. The amount reimbursed shall be without interest or
adjustment for change in monetary values and may not exceed the
net value of the property at the time of the division.53
Later in 1980, the California Court decided Moore, favorably citing both
Aufmuth and Lucas and claiming to follow their formula;54 however, it actually
adopted a different rule. Ms. Moore purchased a house eight months prior to the
marriage, borrowing $40,000 and paying $56,640.57. Prior to marriage, she reduced
the loan by $245.18; oddly, the Court noted this fact but failed to give her credit for
the principal reduction.55 During the marriage, community funds reduced the loan
principal by $5,986.20. The date-of-divorce house fair market value was $160,000.56
Per Lucas/Aufmuth, Mr. Moore would have received $39,489.71;57
however, the Court computed his share as $8,455.65,58 explaining:
[U]nder the Lucas/Aufmuth formula the proceeds of the loan must
be treated as a separate property contribution. Accordingly, the
formula would be applied as follows: . . . The community property
percentage interest is found by dividing the amount by which
community property payments reduced the principal by the
purchase price ($5,986.20 divided by $56,640.57 equals 10.57
percent). The community property share would be $16,911.29,
which represents the amount of capital appreciation attributable to
community funds (10.57 percent of $103,359.43) added to the
amount of equity paid by community funds ($5,986.20).59
Algebraically, that is:

51. Id. at 287–90.
52. See In re the Marriage of G.C & R. W., 232 Cal. Rptr. 3d 484, 498-500 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), for
a discussion of the statutory changes.
53. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2640 (West, Westlaw through urgency legislation through Ch. 5 of 2019 Reg.
Sess.).
54. In re Marriage of Moore, 618 P.2d 208, 211 (Cal. 1980).
55. Id. at 209, 211.
56. Id. at 209.
,

57.

,

.

,

.

,

.

39,489.71.

58. See Moore, 618 P.2d at 211 (finding the community share to be $16,911.29).
59. Id. at 211.
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The difference results because in Lucas/Aufmuth, both spouses held the
property and both were liable for the loan;60 in contrast, in Moore, the wife purchased
the property prior to the marriage and was solely responsible for the loan.
Calculations herein use the California Moore formula because the examples
involve property acquired pre-marriage. California courts continue to cite Lucas,
Moore, and Aufmuth favorably. In a notable 2015 decision, the Court of Appeal61
instructed the trial court to calculate the separate and community interests “in
accordance with the formula established in Aufmuth and Moore.”62 Considering that
Aufmuth and Moore posit two different formulas, how the trial court was supposed
to calculate the interests is unclear. Presumably, the trial court realized it must apply
Moore rather than Aufmuth because the court found the loan was a separate
obligation.63
In 1986, a New Mexico court applied the Moore formula,64 noting a prior
favorable Moore citation by the New Mexico Supreme Court.65 The case involved
facts similar to Moore: a wife purchased an encumbered house pre-marriage, but
community assets serviced the debt.66
b.

Kentucky (Brandenburg)

The Kentucky formula arose in 1980,67 but was well-articulated in the 1981
Brandenburg68 decision. Many states use this formula, including Virginia,69 North
Carolina,70 Missouri,71 Maryland,72 Georgia,73 and Delaware.74 It substantially
differs from the California/Florida approach. Brandenburg explained:

60. In re Marriage of Lucas, 614 P.2d 285, 286 (Cal. 1980); In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 152 Cal.
Rptr. 668, 672 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979). See Peter M. Moldave, The Division of the Family Residence
Acquired with a Mixture of Separate and Community Funds 70 CAL. L. REV. 1263, 1266–69 (1982)
(discussing the Lucas/Moore differences).
61. In re Marriage of Bonvino, 194 Cal. Rptr. 3d 754 (2015).
62. Id. at 771.
63. Id.
64. Dorbin v. Dorbin, 731 P.2d 959, 963 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
65. Id. at 962, citing Chance v. Kitchell, 659 P.2d 895 (N.M. 1983).
66. Id. at 960.
67. Newman v. Newman, 597 S.W.2d 137 (Ky. 1980) (relied on by Brandenburg, 617 S.W. 2d at
872).
68. Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d 871 (Ky. App. 1981).
69. Hart v. Hart, 27 Va. App. 46, 65–66, 497 S.E.2d 496, 505 (1998), (adopting the Brandenburg
formula); Martin v. Martin, 501 S.E.2d 450, 454 (Va. App. 1998) (re-affirming use of Brandenburg, but
stressing it was optional).
70. Willis v. Willis, 358 S.E.2d 571, 572–73 (N.C. App. 1987).
71. Selby v. Selby 149 S.W.3d 472, 483–84 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (using the Brandenburg formula
but without citation to Brandenburg).
72. Harper v. Harper, 448 A.2d 916, 928–29 (Md. App. 1982) (describing a formula algebraically
identical to Brandenburg).
73. Thomas v. Thomas, 377 S.E.2d 666, 669 (Ga. 1989) (adopting the Harper formula).
74. Albanese v. Albanese, 676 A.2d 900 (Del. 1995) (adopting the Harper formula).

Summer 2019 HOW A SPOUSE CAN PROFIT BY PAYING PARTNER'S PRINCIPAL 291

Nonmarital contribution (nmc) is defined as the equity in the
property at the time of marriage, plus any amount expended after
marriage by either spouse from traceable nonmarital funds in the
reduction of mortgage principal, and/or the value of improvements
made to the property from such nonmarital funds.
Marital contribution (mc) is defined as the amount expended after
marriage from other than nonmarital funds in the reduction of
mortgage principal, plus the value of all improvements made to the
property after marriage from other than nonmarital funds.
Total contribution (tc) is defined as the sum of nonmarital and
marital contributions.
Equity (e) is defined as the equity in the property at the time
of distribution. This may be either at the date of the decree of
dissolution, or, if the property has been sold prior thereto and the
proceeds may be properly traced, then the date of the sale shall be
the time at which the equity is computed.
The formula to be utilized is:
nmc/tc X e = nonmarital property
mc/tc X e = marital property75
Expressed in terms comparable to those above, the Brandenburg formula
is:

MA= Marital asset.
V1 = Date-of-acquisition value of marital home.
V2 = Date-of-separation value of marital home.
D1 = Date-of-acquisition secured debt.
D2 = Date-of-separation secured debt.
Kentucky uses a different formula for separate contributions to the purchase
of a marital home during the marriage, as required by Kentucky statute.76 The 1981
Travis77 decision affirmed the reversal of a trial court’s application of Brandenburg
to a house acquired during marriage: the husband failed to prove the appreciation
resulted from general economic conditions rather than from the parties’ efforts.78
Calculations herein use the Brandenburg formula for Kentucky because all examples
involve a separate encumbered home brought into a marriage.
Another notable Kentucky appellate decision was Woosnam79 in 1979,
which used a different formula:

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d at 872.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.190(3) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 201 of the 2019 Reg. Sess.).
Travis v. Travis, 59 S.W.3d 904, 910 (Ky. 2001).
Id. at 912.
Woosnam v. Woosnam, 587 S.W.2d 262 (Ky. App. 1979).
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MA= Marital asset.
V1 = Date-of-acquisition value of marital home.
V2 = Date-of-separation value of marital home.
D1 = Date-of-acquisition secured debt.
D2 = Date-of-separation secured debt.
Although Brandenburg80 stressed and Newman81 suggested the formula
they used was not the only possible Kentucky formula, it appears to be the most
widely-used, albeit often criticized.82 Woosnam is noteworthy because Minnesota
adopted it in 1981,83 a year after Newman. Also noteworthy is the Travis citation to
both Brandenburg and Woosnam, with no mention of their differences:
Kentucky courts have typically applied the “source of funds” rule to
characterize property or to determine parties’ nonmarital and marital interests in such
property.84
Missouri uses a formula identical to that of Brandenburg:
Under the “source of funds” rule, property is considered to be
acquired, not when title passes, but as it is paid for. Incremental
property values are allocated proportionately to either marital or
separate estates according to the source of funds used to purchase
the property.85
A later Missouri case described the formula clearly:
We must know: (a) the value of the property at the time of
marriage; (b) the indebtedness on the property at the time of
marriage; (c) how much the indebtedness has been reduced due to
marital funds (this is the marital contribution (MC)); (d) the value
of the property at the time of dissolution; and (e) the indebtedness
at the time of dissolution. The non-marital contribution (NMC) is
(a) minus (b) and the equity (E) is (d) minus (e). Total contribution
(TC) is the sum of the MC and NMC. Non- marital property =
80. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d at 873 (explaining it might approve other “procedures”). But see,
Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d at 875 (Gudgel, J., concurring and suggesting other formulas have been
“abandoned.”).
81. Newman, 597 S.W.2d at 138 (explaining part the court’s job was determining whether the trial
court’s formula was “proper.”).
82. See, Lisa Milot, Accounting for Time: A Relative-Interest Approach to the Division of Equity in
Hybrid-Property Homes Upon Divorce, 100 KY. L.J. 585, 593–95 (criticizing Brandenburg for failing to
consider time properly); TURNER, supra note 3 at 38 (criticizing both Brandenburg and Keeling for failing
to consider interest payments.)
83. Schmitz v. Schmitz, 309 N.W.2d 748, 750 (Minn. 1981).
84. Travis, 59 S.W.3d at 909 (footnotes omitted). The Court correctly described the “source of funds
rule” as: “The “source of funds rule” simply means that the character of the property, i.e., whether it is
marital, nonmarital, or both, is determined by the source of the funds used to acquire property.” But, in a
footnote, the Court oddly cited to multiple cases, including Woosnam and Brandenburg without noting
the very different formulas they used.
85. Hill v. Hill 747 S.W.2d 718, 719 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted).
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(NMC/TC)E. Marital property = (MC/TC)E. If the property is
debt-free, the court substitutes the value of the property (V) for the
equity.86
Similarly, North Carolina has used the same formula, albeit with a less
precise definition:
“[A]cquisition is an ongoing process of making payment for
property or contributing to the marital estate rather than being
fixed on the date that legal title to property is obtained.” The
approach adopted by our courts is commonly known as the “source
of funds” approach.. . . The trial judge must divide the equity
based on the proportion invested by the marital and
separate estates.87
Maryland, also uses the Brandenburg formula, albeit without citation to the
Kentucky decision. Instead, the 1982 Maryland appellate court stated in Harper v.
Harper,88 that it was adopting the “source of funds” rule as if such a single rule
existed.89 It traced the rule to several states. Of note, it favorably cited Moore90 from
California as well as Tibbets91 from Maine, each of which adopted very different
rules than that articulated by Maryland:
[U]nder the Maryland Act the appropriate analysis to be applied is
the source of funds theory. Under that theory, when property is
acquired by an expenditure of both nonmarital and marital
property, the property is characterized as part nonmarital and part
marital. Thus, a spouse contributing nonmarital property is entitled
to an interest in the property in the ratio of the nonmarital
investment to the total nonmarital and marital investment in the
property. The remaining property is characterized as marital
property and its value is subject to equitable distribution. Thus, the
spouse who contributed nonmarital funds, and the marital unit that
contributed marital funds each receive a proportionate and fair
return on their investment.
We recognize that in order to apply the source of funds theory in
Maryland, it is necessary to adopt, as did the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine, an interpretation that defines the term “acquired,”
appearing in §3-6A-01 (e), as the on-going process of making
payment for property. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d at 77. Under this
definition, characterization of property as nonmarital or marital
depends upon the source of each contribution as payments are

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Selby v. Selby, 149 S.W.3d 472, 484 (Mo. Ct. App. App. 2004) (citations omitted).
Willis v. Willis, 358 S.E.2d 571, 572 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
Harper v. Harper, 448 A.2d 916 (Md. 1982).
Id. at 929.
Id. at 924.
Id. at 925–26.
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made, rather than the time at which legal or equitable title to or
possession of the property is obtained. 92
Facially, the Maryland formula appears to have a math error, as the nonmarital and marital values are not additive inverses if one considers the debt.93
However, the court likely defined the word “property” as the property equity, which
eliminates any error. The adoption of the Tibbetts definition of “acquired” referring
to “payments” rather than loans supports that conclusion.
In 1995, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted the Maryland formula:
In our view the Harper standard has much to commend it and we
adopt it as an appropriate tool for fixing spousal entitlement to
property which reflects a mix of premarital and marital
acquisitions.94
The Court, however, did not illustrate the formula algebraically or with an
example. A later 2008 Delaware decision clarified the formula with an example
which follows Brandenburg.95

92. Id. at 929 (citation omitted).
93. Assume Husband purchased a $100,000 house using $80,000 of debt, the marital estate paid
$20,000 of the principal, and the property had a $150,000 date-of-divorce value. Per Tibbetts, investment
in the property is $40,000. Half was from Husband: $20,000 down-payment. Half of the property is
$75,000, defining the property as the whole. The remainder would have a $75,000 value but debt of
$60,000. That does not appear to be what Harper intended; instead, the Court likely sought to multiply
the 50% separate portion by the $90,000 equity, resulting in $45,000 being separate and $45,000 marital.
Indeed, that is the interpretation given Albanese by at least one Delaware court. See S.E.T. v. L.T., 2008
WL 2897371, at *22 (Del. Fam. Ct. May 16, 2008) (citing Albanese v. Albanese 676 A.2d 900 (Del.
1995)) (adopting the Harper formula in 1995, but not expressing it algebraically or with an example). But
see, Grant v. Zich, 477 A.2d 1163, 1174 n.9 (Md. 1984) in which the Court explained:
A husband and wife acquired real property for a purchase price of $40,000. The wife
contributed a down payment of $10,000 from property that she acquired prior to
marriage. The remaining $30,000 was financed by a mortgage signed by both the
husband and the wife. One-quarter of the value of the property is the wife’s nonmarital
property and three-quarters of the value of the property is marital property.
If, at the time of the dissolution of the marriage, the property has appreciated in value
to a fair market value of $60,000 and the mortgage indebtedness has been reduced to
$20,000 by the payment of $10,000 of marital funds, the following division would be
appropriate. One-quarter of the $ 60,000 fair market value of the property, or $15,000,
would be the wife’s nonmarital property, not subject to equitable distribution. From the
remaining $45,000, $20,000, representing the unpaid mortgage balance, would be
deducted leaving $25,000 as the net value of the marital property subject to equitable
distribution.
Grant, 477 A.2d at 1174 n.9. Grant differed from Harper in that the property was acquired after marriage,
while in Harper, Husband brought unimproved land into the marriage and the parties made substantial
improvements. Harper, 448 A.2d at 918. Further, the 1994 Maryland Legislature overruled Grant.
McGeehan v. McGeehan, 167 A.3d 579, 588 (2017). This paper treats Maryland as following
Brandenburg. The Grant formula is algebraically equivalent to the Maine formula, described at infra note
110.
94. Albanese v. Albanese, 676 A.2d 900, at *2 (Table) (Del. 1996).
95. See S.E.T. v. L.T., 2008 WL 2897371, at *21–22 (Del. Fam. Ct. May 16, 2008).
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In 1989, the Georgia Supreme Court adopted Harper.96 Subsequent Georgia
cases illustrate the formula such that it is algebraically identical to Brandenburg.97
Virginia has used the Brandenburg formula,98 but has also used a different
formula occasionally. In the 2006 Keeling99 decision, the appellate court considered
a case in which Husband used separate funds to help purchase a home during
marriage and also to pay some principal and refinancing costs. The court formula
was:

MA= Marital asset.
V1 = Date-of-acquisition value of marital home.
V2 = Date-of-separation value of marital home.
D1 = Date-of-acquisition secured debt.
D2 = Date-of-separation secured debt.
c.

Nevada

Nevada uses a formula which it describes as a “slightly modified” Moore
approach:100
CP = PD+(PD + OL)/(PP) X (A)101
CP is community property interest, PD is principal paid with community
funds, OL is the community share of principal owed at dissolution, PP is the purchase
price and A is the appreciation. Nevada allocates the remaining loan balance by the
number of payments made with community funds as a percentage of the total number
of payments, regardless whether the payments occurred before or after the marriage.
The formula is not easily compared to others examined herein for several reasons:
(1) it uses the house’s original purchase price102 rather than the date-of-marriage
value, (2) it uses the original loan103 amount, rather than the date-of-marriage
amount, and (3) it allocates the remaining loan by the number of payments104 rather
than by the payment amounts.
Assuming, for comparison purposes, the formula applies to homes
purchased shortly prior to a marriage – which eliminates the debt allocation – it
appears as:

96. See Thomas v. Thomas, 377 S.E.2d 666, 670 (Ga. 1989).
97. E.g., Hubby v. Hubby, 556 S.E.2d 127, 128–29 (Ga. 2001).
98. See Hart v. Hart, 27 Va. App. 46, 65–66, 497 S.E.2d 496, 505 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
99. Keeling v. Keeling, 624 S.E.2d 687, 688, 691 (Va. App. 2006) (rejecting Brandenburg’s use
because the trial court did not consider the couples’ joint loan obligation in its equity calculations).
100. Malmquist v. Malmquist, 792 P.2d 372, 374 (Nev. 1990) (“We adopt a slightly modified version
of the Moore apportionment.”).
101. Id. at 377 fig.2.
102. Id. at 378 fig.(g).
103. Id. at 378 fig.(e), (f).
104. Id. at 379.
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CA= Community asset.
V1 = Date-of-acquisition value of marital home.
V2 = Date-of-separation value of marital home.
D1 = Date-of-acquisition secured debt.
D2 = Date-of-separation secured debt.
The formula purports to consider the timing of the contributions,105 but it
actually does not.106 Consider the following examples to illustrate the odd Nevada
debt allocation.
Example 1: Fifteen years prior to marriage, A purchased a
$100,000 house, paying $20,000 down and financing $80,000 at
5% for thirty years with $429.46 monthly payments. The date-ofmarriage loan balance was $54,307.13. A used community funds
to make loan payments during a five-year marriage. Prior to and
during the marriage, the house appreciated at a constant 5%
nominal annual rate. The house date-of-marriage value was
$211,370.39 and its date-of-divorce value is $271,264.03, with a
$40,489.81 loan balance.
Example 2: Same facts as Example 1, except A purchased the
house the day prior to the marriage for $211,370.39, paying
$157,063.26 down and financing $54,307.13 at 5% for fifteen
years. Each payment would be $429.46. The date-of-divorce value
is $271,264.03, with a $40,489.81 loan balance.
In each example, A’s date-of-marriage contribution is identical and the
community contribution is identical. However, the Example 1 community share
would be $54,817.54,107 while the Example 2 share would be $29,205.72.108
Although economically identical, the examples produce dramatically different
results, which produces marriage planning opportunities. A well-advised, home
owning, soon-to-be spouse would either sell the Example 1 home and purchase a
new one or would re-finance in such a way as to create the Example 2 formalities.
Further, the examples include the unlikely assumption of constant appreciation both

105. Id., quoting from and adopting a formula proposed in Peter M. Moldave, The Division of the
Family Residence Acquired with a Mixture of Separate and Community Funds, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1263
(1982) (referring to a “time rule”).
106. The formula compares the number of payments made with marital/community funds to the
number of payments made with separate funds; however, despite being described as a “time rule,” it does
not weigh earlier payments different from later ones. As a result, the timing is irrelevant: a payment in
1980 would have the same impact as one in 2018.
107.

54,307.13

40,489.81

,

.

,

.

,

,

.

271,264.03

100,000 .

The division by 4 occurs because one-fourth of the 240 payments were during the marriage.
108.

54,307.13

40,489.81

.
,

.

271,264.03

211,370.39 .
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prior to and during the marriage. If, as would seem more likely, the house appreciated
at varying rates during the twenty-year period, the results would be further skewed.
d.

Maine and Minnesota

Maine adopted a source of funds formula in a 1979109 decision later
overruled in 1997.110 The over-ruled issue, however, involved the transmutation
doctrine111 and title, rather than the allocation formula. As a result, the formula
remains at least noteworthy. The 1979 Tibbets Maine Supreme Court described the
formula:
For $20,000 a husband and wife acquire a parcel of real estate. A down
payment of $5,000 is contributed by the wife from property acquired prior to the
marriage and the remaining $15,000 is financed through credit. One-quarter of that
parcel is the wife’s non-marital property. If the property appreciates in value to
$30,000 and the parties contribute an additional $5,000 of marital property toward
its purchase, the following division would be required. One-quarter of the value of
the parcel or $7,500 is non-marital property to be set apart to the wife. Assuming a
remaining mortgage of $10,000, since $10,000 in total has been contributed toward
purchase of the parcel valued initially at $20,000, there will remain an equity of
$12,500 of marital property to be divided.112
The “$5,000” reference is not entirely clear; however, it likely refers to
principal reduction in the loan used to finance the property. The formula is
algebraically:

MA= Marital asset.
V1 = Date-of-acquisition value of marital home.
V2 = Date-of-separation value of marital home.
D1 = Date-of-acquisition secured debt.
D2 = Date-of-separation secured debt.
As discussed earlier, the 1981 Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the preBrandenburg Kentucky Woosnam formula. Affirming the lower court, the Court
stated: “This reasoning is basically in accord with the analysis in Woosnam which
we approve.”113 That case involved the purchase of a home during a marriage using
some separate funds. A later Minnesota decision applied the rule to an encumbered
home brought into the marriage.114 The court’s description of the formula is
algebraically the same as the Maine Tibbets formula.115

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70, 76 (Me. 1979).
Long v. Long, 697 A.2d 1317, 1319 (Me. 1997).
Id. at 1324.
Tibbetts, 406 A.2d at 75, n.5.
Schmitz v. Schmitz, 309 N.W.2d 748, 750 (Minn. 1981).
Stroh v. Stroh, 383 N.W.2d 402, 404 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
See id. at 406.
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Assuming, for purposes of comparison, the Nevada formula applies to a
home purchased very shortly prior to the marriage, the Maine/Minnesota formula is
identical to the Nevada formula.116
e.

Florida

A Florida analysis has four aspects: the pre-2009 Landay117 formula, the
2008 statute repealing the doctrine of “special equity” and all related formulas,118 the
2010 Supreme Court Kaaa119 decision, and the 2018 statute120 replacing the Kaaa
formula.
i.

Pre-2008

Pre-2008, Florida courts characterized the enhancement of a non-marital
asset – using marital funds or labor – as creating a “special equity” in the nonmarital
asset. As recognized by some commentators121 this was a misnomer: courts should
have referred to the enhanced value as a marital asset.122
The Second DCA placed a static character on the special equity: whatever
it was worth at the time of the enhancement, it was worth at the time of the marital

116.

117. See Landay v. Landay, 429 So.2d 1197, 1199-1200 (Fla. 1983).
118. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.075(11) (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 26th Legis.,
2019): Special equity is abolished. All claims formerly identified as special equity, and all special equity
calculations, are abolished and shall be asserted either as a claim for unequal distribution of marital
property and resolved by the factors set forth in subsection (1) or as a claim of enhancement in value or
appreciation of nonmarital property.
119. Kaaa v. Kaaa, 58 So.3d 867 (Fla. 2010). The surname of the parties is Hawaiian; it is pronounced
“Ka - ah – ah”, with three syllables. Initial Brief: Appellant-Petitioner at 3, 2009 FL S. Ct. Briefs 967
(2009).
120. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.075(10)
121. Victoria M. Ho & Rebecca Y. Zung, Special Equity and Unequal Distribution of Assets, 75 FLA.
B.J. no. 10, at 79.
122. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.075(6). As used in this section:
(a)1. “Marital assets and liabilities” include:
....
(b). The enhancement in value and appreciation of nonmarital assets resulting either from the efforts of
either party during the marriage or from the contribution to or expenditure thereon of marital funds or
other forms of marital assets, or both.
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asset valuation date.123 In contrast, all other DCAs,124 as well as the Florida Supreme
Court, followed Landay,125 using four steps:
1. Value the property pre-enhancement.
2. Value the property post-enhancement.
3. Value the property at the marital asset valuation date.
4. Divide the difference between Value 2 and Value 1 by Value 1
and multiply the result by Value 3.
The result would constitute the marital asset – then known as a special
equity. Algebraically it was:

SE= Special equity.
V1 = Value of separately owned marital home prior to the
enhancement.
V2 = Value of separately owned marital home immediately after
the enhancement.
V3 = Value of separately owned marital home at the asset valuation
date.
While useful for physical improvements – such as the Kaaa garage
enclosure – the formula is extremely complicated to use for the subject of this article
– secured debt payments related to the marital home. Using it for debt payments
would require monthly determinations of value changes.126
ii.

2008 statute

In 2008, the Florida Legislature abolished “special equity,” as well as all
existing formulas for measuring it:
(11) Special equity is abolished. All claims formerly identified
as special equity, and all special equity calculations, are abolished
and shall be asserted either as a claim for unequal distribution of
marital property and resolved by the factors set forth in subsection
(1) or as a claim of enhancement in value or appreciation of
nonmarital property.127
This act properly re-named a “special equity” claim as a marital asset
interest; however, it also prompted two problems:
123. Kaaa v. Kaaa, 9 So. 3d 756, 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (certifying a District split to the Florida
Supreme Court), quashed and remanded, Kaaa 58 So.3d at 873.
124. Stevens v. Stevens, 651 So. 2d 1306, 1307–08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Jahnke v. Jahnke, 804
So. 2d 513, 518 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Oldham v. Oldham, 683 So.2d 579, 580 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1996) (citing Stevens, 651 So. 2d 1306); Becker v. Becker, 639 So. 2d 1082, 1084 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1994); see Dawn D. Nichols and Sean K. Ahmed, Nonmarital Real Estate: Is the Appreciation Marital,
Nonmarital, or a Combination of Both?, 81 FLA. B.J. no. 9 at 75, 78 (2007).
125. Landay v. Landay, 429 So. 2d 1197, 1199 (Fla. 1983).
126. But see, Milot, supra note 3 at 595, suggesting just such a complicated formula.
127. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.075(11) (emphasis added).
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1. It abolished the long-used Landay formula but failed to replace it.
2. It created two alternative remedies for the same issue:
a.
b.

A non-owner-spouse claim for a greater portion of
marital assets, without counting the enhancement as one
of those assets.
A claim that the enhancement itself is a marital asset of
which the non-owner-spouse should receive an equitable
portion.128

The lack of a statutory formula and the abolishment of the widely-used
(albeit misnamed129) Landay formula left courts without a method of measuring the
enhancement claim. In addition, the creation of alternative remedies appeared odd.
Either claim is defensible, but they differ. The statute unfortunately provided no
guidance to trial judges regarding which to use. Further, the two remedies have
differing appellate significance. The first is equitable, subject to judicial discretion,
and thus appealable on an abuse-of-discretion standard.130 The second is legal –
determining what is a marital asset – thus appealable de novo.131 In 2010, Kaaa
applied both claims to the same asset, further confusing the issue.132
iii.

Kaaa.

In 2010, the Florida Supreme Court adopted two different formulas for
measuring an enhancement claim – the second 2008 statutory remedy; thus, the issue
split into three possible approaches. The first Kaaa formula, the focus herein,
addressed the use of marital funds to “service” separate purchase-money debt
secured by the marital home. The Court described this as applying to “passive

128. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.075(1).
129. The Landay reference to a “special equity” created confusion because the formula measured a
marital asset, not an equitable interest or equitable remedy.
130. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla.1980) (“In reviewing a true discretionary act,
the appellate court must fully recognize the superior vantage point of the trial judge and should apply the
“reasonableness” test to determine whether the trial judge abused his discretion. If reasonable men could
differ as to the propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then the action is not unreasonable and there
can be no finding of an abuse of discretion. The discretionary ruling of the trial judge should be disturbed
only when his decision fails to satisfy this test of reasonableness.”). Canakaris created the remedy of
equitable distribution of marital assets and liabilities in Florida, later codified in 1987. Id. at 1201.
131. Puskar v. Puskar, 29 So. 3d 1201, 1203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (“We review de novo
identification of an asset as marital or non-marital.”). Cf. D’Angelo v. Fitzmaurice, 863 So. 2d 311, 314
(Fla. 2003) (citing Armstrong v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 2000)) (“The standard of review for the pure
questions of law before us is de novo. . . . Therefore, no deference is given to the judgment of the lower
courts.”).
132. “Because paying the mortgage is a prerequisite to enjoying the appreciation in value of the marital
home, we conclude that principles of equity do not allow an owner spouse to receive the full benefit of
the passive appreciation when the nonowner spouse contributed to the property, and marital funds were
used to pay the mortgage. Such inequities must be balanced by the trial court making specific factual
findings regarding the contributions of the nonowner spouse and the relationship of those contributions to
the passive appreciation of the property.” Kaaa v. Kaaa, 58 So. 3d at 871–72 (Fla. 2010) (emphasis added)
(applying an equitable standard after describing the issue as a question of law: “Because this is a pure
question of law, our standard of review is de novo.” Id. at 869).
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appreciation.”133 The second addressed “active appreciation” in separate property
resulting from marital funds or efforts. The existence of two separate formulae is
questionable and arguably increases uncertainty.134 This article discusses the second
formula only briefly.
The first formula is arguably:

Each spouse would be entitled to an equitable portion of that amount, with
50% being the presumed portion. As described by the Court:
In general, in the absence of improvements, the portion of the
appreciated value of a separate asset which should be treated as a
marital asset will be the same as the fraction calculated by dividing
the indebtedness with which the asset was encumbered at the time
of the marriage by the value of the asset at the time of the marriage.
. . . The value of this marital asset should be reduced, however, by
the unpaid indebtedness marital funds were used to service.135
The formula is, unfortunately, unclear because of the reference to the
separate asset “appreciated value.” Commentators have read that to refer to the
difference between the end-of-marriage value and the beginning-of-marriage
value.136 Arguably, the Court meant what it said: multiply the leveraged portion by
the end-of-marriage value, assuming the asset appreciated. That reading would treat
the asset as marital to the extent it was leveraged and marital funds serviced the debt.
The decision is also unclear whether one must count the principal payments
twice: once as creating “active appreciation” and a second time as forming part of
the “passive appreciation.” Counting the payments once – as the above formula does
– is apparently incorrect, as found by several courts and commentators.137 As a result,
the Kaaa formula is:

133. Id. at 869.
134. Arguably, a separate formula for debt payments is appropriate. For example, if
marital/community funds add a room to a house, the improvement can be valued when it occurs. Valuing
the impact of debt payments other than at an amount equal to the payment (principal or principal and
interest) has less to do with the value of the security than the exact amount involved. In contrast, many
studies suggest various home improvements have different consequences. E.g., Nick Caruso, Cost vs.
Value: Which Home Improvements Offer the Highest ROI in 2017?, RIS MEDIA,
http://rismedia.com/2017/01/17/cost-value-home-improvements-offer-highest-roi-2017 (last visited Apr.
23, 2019). For example, re-placing a front door may improve the home value almost dollar for dollar, but
adding an outdoor deck may cause a far lower increase.
135. Kaaa, 58 So. 3d at 872 (quoting Stevens v. Stevens, 651 So. 2d 1306, 1307–08 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995)).
136. Manz, supra note 3, at 42; Dawn D. Nichols & Sean K. Ahmed, Nonmarital Real Estate: Is the
Appreciation Marital, Nonmarital, or a Combination of Both?, 81 FLA. B.J., Oct. 2007, at 75, 75–76.
137. Somasca v. Somasca, 171 So. 3d 780, 783 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015); Ballard v. Ballard, 158 So.
3d 641, 643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014); Manz, supra note 3, at 42; Fla. Senate Comm. on Banking & Ins.,
Bill Analysis and Fiscal Impact Statement, S. 676, 2018 Sess., at 5 (Jan. 29, 2018),
http://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2018/676/Analyses/2018s00676.bi.PDF.
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As ably demonstrated by others,138 the Kaaa debt payment formula creates
distortions. In particular, it results in a large non-owner-spouse windfall whenever
the asset appreciation exceeds the secured loan interest rate. Or, it shortchanges the
non-owner-spouse whenever the loan rate exceeds the asset appreciation.
iv.

Florida 2018 Statute

Florida practitioners criticized the main Kaaa formula and recommended a
new statute,139 which the 2018 legislature adopted.140 The formula is identical to
California Moore:

As described by the Florida Senate Judiciary Committee Staff:
[T]he passive appreciation in the marital property which is subject
to equitable distribution must be determined by multiplying the
marital fraction by the passive appreciation of the property during
the marriage.
The passive appreciation is determined by subtracting the gross
value of the property on date of the marriage or the date of
acquisition of the property, whichever is later, from the value of
the property on the valuation date in the dissolution action, less
any active appreciation of the property during the marriage and
less any additional debts secured by the property during the
marriage.
The numerator of the marital fraction consists of the amount of
mortgage principal paid on any mortgage on the property from
marital funds. The denominator consists of the value of the real
property on the date of marriage, the date of acquisition of the
property, or the date the property was first encumbered by a
mortgage on which principal was paid from marital funds,
whichever is later.
The value of the marital portion of nonmarital real property may
not exceed the total net equity of the property on the valuation date
in the dissolution action.141
f.

Texas, Louisiana, and Idaho

Texas – a community property state – has a detailed non-appreciation
reimbursement statute. The community receives reimbursement for amounts
expended paying separate debts; however, the Texas statute ignores appreciation in
the property securing the debt. It defines a reimbursement claim as including:
(1) payment by one marital estate of the unsecured liabilities of
another marital estate;
138. Manz, supra note 3, at 42; 2012 BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 32, at 4.
139. Id.
140. Act of Mar. 21, 2018, ch. 56, 2018 Fla. Laws 1051 (codified at FLA. Stat. § 61.075(6)(a)(1)(c)
(2018)).
141. 2012 BILL ANALYSIS supra note 32, at 5.
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....

(3) the reduction of the principal amount of a debt secured by a
lien on property owned before marriage, to the extent the debt
existed at the time of marriage;142
The claim specifically refers only to principal. Texas courts have clarified
that even as to unsecured debts, a reimbursement claim is “dollar for dollar” without
consideration of interest or the time value of money.143 The statute also precludes
reimbursement for five specific claims. 144 Section 402 places the burden of proof on
the claiming spouse, classifies the claims as “equitable,” and allows offsets for the
use of the separate property.145 The formula is simple:
MC = Marital claim.
Louisiana – also a community property state – uses the same formula, albeit
with different logical support: the remedy is legal, rather than equitable:
If community property has been used during the existence of the
community property regime or former community property has
been used thereafter to satisfy a separate obligation of a spouse,
the other spouse is entitled to reimbursement for one-half of the
amount or value that the property had at the time it was used.146
Louisiana differs from Texas in considering separate property fruits to be
community;147 hence, the law would not consider the Texas offset option to the extent
the non-owner-spouse benefitted from the property.
Idaho, another community property state, has used a similar reimbursement
rule recognized by some Courts,148 though not clearly codified. The Idaho Supreme
Court, however, has articulated an appreciation reimbursement claim algebraically
similar to that of Florida.149
California, another community property state, enacted a reimbursement
formula in 1983, but it applies only to separate property used to pay community
liabilities or to separate property of one spouse used to pay the separate property of
142. TEX. FAM. CODE Ann. § 3.402(a) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of the 86th Legis.).
The section also includes claims for principal payments reducing debt on separate property received by
gift or devise, id. at (4), and for principal payments on “home equity” and refinanced debts attributable to
separate property. Id. at (5)–(9).
143. See Penick v. Penick, 783 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1988) (explaining reimbursement is for the
amount expended, with the possibility of some equitable offsets reducing, not increasing, the claim).
144. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.409 (including child support, alimony and student loans).
145. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.402(b), (e).
146. LA. CIV. CODE Ann. art. 2364 (West, Westlaw through 2018 3d Extraordinary Sess.).
147. LA. CIV. CODE Ann. art. 2339; Willis v. Willis, 454 So. 2d 429, 430–31 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
Because the use of the separate secured property would belong to the Louisiana community, no offset
would be appropriate.
148. Vanwassenhove v. Vanwassenhove, 998 P.2d 505, 507 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990). Why the Idaho
court applied a reimbursement obligation unaffected by appreciation was unclear. The court did not cite
the pre-existing Martsch opinion.
149. Martsch v. Martsch, 645 P.2d 882, 887 (Idaho 1982).
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the other. It does not apply to the topic of this article: community funds paying
separate secured debt.150
g.

Pennsylvania and Colorado

Under Pennsylvania law,151 the increase in value of separate property is
marital. As a result, it uses a very simple formula:
A 1986 Pennsylvania decision152 reversed the trial court, ordering it to apply
the statute; however, the court emphasized that the equitable division of a marital
asset need not be equal. It listed a variety of factors justifying an unequal division,
including the parties’ contribution to the asset.
Colorado153 uses the same formula as Pennsylvania.
h.

Illinois

Illinois, and some other states,154 historically used a transmutation theory
under which commingled assets became marital. Indeed, the Illinois Supreme
Court155 in 1981 applied the doctrine to a husband’s separately-owned home in which
the spouses lived. Because Husband used marital funds to pay his secured debt, the
house became marital. Widely criticized, the doctrine lost some of its fervor from
1982 legislation.156 Nevertheless, the approach provides another interesting formula
for comparison and is thus used below. It is:
A 2007 Illinois appellate decision applied a rule essentially the opposite of
transmutation: it fully offset wife’s reimbursement claim with the imputed rental
value of the house:
We conclude that the benefit of the use of the Port Barrington
property fully compensated the marital estate for its contribution
and that the marital estate is not entitled to reimbursement.
Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the judgment awarding
150. CAL. FAM. CODE § 2640 (West, Westlaw through urgency legislation through Ch. 5 of 2019 Reg.
Sess.).
151. “Subsection 401(e) of the Divorce Code states:
(e) For purposes of this chapter only, “marital property” means all property acquired by either party during
the marriage except:
....
(3) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent except for the increase in value during the
marriage.”
quoted in Anthony v. Anthony, 514 A.2d 91, 93 (Penn. App. 1986).
152. Anthony 514 A.2d at 94 (citing 23 P.S. § 401(d)(7)).
153. COLO. REV. STAT. §14-10-113(4) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.); e.g., In re Marriage
of Reeser, 635 P.2d 930, 933 (Colo. App. 1981).
154. See Joan M. Krauskopf, The Transmutation and Source of Funds Rules In Division of Marital
Property, 50 MO. L. REV. 759 (1985) (criticizing generally the theory as used in Missouri).
155. In Re Marriage of Lee, 430 N.E.2d 1030, 1032 (1981).
156. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/503(c)(1) (West. Westlaw through 2018 Legis. Sess.). See Feldman and
Fleck, supra note 41 (discussing a 1982 Illinois law change providing reimbursement as a likely
alternative to transmutation).
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Karen $20,000 as her share of marital assets used to pay for the
Port Barrington home.157
i.

Proposal

MA= Marital asset.
Pmt = Monthly loan payment
n = Number of payments during the marriage.
Although this formula may appear complex, it is actually quite simple.158 It
requires the owner-spouse to reimburse the non-owner for half of all separate loan
payments (interest and principal) inflated to current dollars using an interest rate
equal to the average periodic appreciation on the security.
C. Other important issues to consider
All formulas considered herein include as factors, some or all of the
following:




principal payments
down-payments
encumbered property appreciation.

Each formula excludes the following issues, although they sometimes deal
with them separately:





interest
repair and maintenance costs
property taxes
improvements

157. In Re Marriage of Ford, 879 N.E.2d 335, 340 (Ill. App. 2007) (reversing a $20,000 award $20,000
to wife because Husband used $58,000 of marital funds to pay principal on separate secured debt).
158. Using an HP 10Bii calculator, set P/yr to 12, PV to zero, N to the number of monthly payments
during the marriage, and i/yr to the house appreciation stated as a nominal rate. The mode would be a
function of the first payment date, but will have minimal impact. Press FV for the answer, which is the
marital/community asset. It will appear as a negative number, but use the absolute value. To compute the
house appreciation rate, set PV as the date-of-marriage house value and FV as the date-of-separation
value. Either the PV or the FV must be a negative number and the other a positive number. Set the PMT
as zero and N as the number of payments during the marriage. Press I/yr for the nominal rate.
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a. What to do About Interest Payments
A significant issue involves the interest payments.159 All formulas analyzed
exclude interest, though the proposed formula includes it. The California Moore
decision explained why it excluded interest and other payments:
Appellant argues, however, that interest and taxes should be
included in the computation because they often represent a
substantial part of current home purchase payments. We do not
agree. Since such expenditures do not increase the equity value of
the property, they should not be considered in its division upon
dissolution of marriage. The value of real property is generally
represented by the owners’ equity in it, and the equity value does
not include finance charges or other expenses incurred to maintain
the investment. [emphasis added] Amounts paid for interest, taxes
and insurance do not contribute to the capital investment and are
not considered part of it. A variety of expenses may be incurred in
the maintenance of investment property, but such expenses are not
considered in the valuation of the property except to the extent they
may be relevant in determining its market value from which in turn
the owners’ equity is derived by subtracting the outstanding
obligation. Upon dissolution, it is the court’s duty to account for
and divide the assets and the debts of the community. Payments
previously made for interest, taxes and insurance are neither.
Moreover, if these items were considered to be part of the
community’s interest, fairness would also require that the
community be charged for its use of the property.160
Essentially the Court gave two reasons: first, the interest does not affect the
property value, and second, considering the interest would compel considering the
rental value contributed by the owner-spouse. Both reasons are flawed.
i. Interest Payments in Relation to Asset Value
The Court is correct, interest payments do not affect the value of the secured
property; however, neither do principal payments. Consider the sentence: “The value
of real property is generally represented by the owners’ equity in it, and the equity
value does not include finance charges or other expenses incurred to maintain the
investment.”161 That viewpoint is inconsistent with accounting as well as financial
reality: property has value independent of debts. The flaws are so fundamental, they
deserve detailed analysis.
(A). Accounting Analysis
The Florida Kaaa Court and all five Florida Appellate Courts incorrectly
analyzed the payment of nonmarital secured obligations with marital funds, as did
the California Court. All viewed the payment as an enhancement of the underlying
159. TURNER, supra note 3 (criticizing states for omitting interest, but not explaining how to include
it).
160. In re Marriage of Moore, 618 P.2d 208, 210–11 (Cal. 1980).
161. Id. at 211.
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property. All variously described such debt payments as “mortgage payments,”162
“house payments,”163 “pay down” of the “mortgage,”164 or as payments “increasing
the “equity in the house.”165 The errors in such analysis are many. They stem from
the mistaken view of “equity” as an asset.
First, one does not “pay” a mortgage. A mortgage is merely a security
device; it is not a debt. It secures an obligation, as opposed to being one. A mortgage
is a type of “right” in that it grants the holder a priority interest in the security.
Payment of secured debt does not enhance this “right”; to the contrary, it necessarily
reduces its value.166 From a creditor’s viewpoint, a secured obligation is more
valuable than an unsecured obligation. The creditor, however, does not have a current
ownership interest in the security; instead, he has a conditional, deferred interest.
Second, one pays debts. One rarely makes “house payments” or “car
payments.” Such transactions occur in matters involving conditional sales: those in
which sellers hold title and purchasers buy the property over time.167 They are also
known as “rent-to-own” contracts. The typical home mortgage loan is nothing like
that; instead, nearly all home purchasers pay cash. They may borrow much of the
cash from a third party,168 such as a bank, but that fundamentally changes nothing:
they pay the seller in full and they grant a mortgage to secure the debt. In such cases,
the purchaser owns the property fully – it is not a conditional sale. The lender does
not “own” the house. The debtor does not make “house payments”; instead, he/she
makes loan payments.
Third, property has value independent of the source of the funds used to
purchase it. Similarly, property has value independent of whether it secures debt or
is subject to a lien. Its value is its value. The amount of any debt – be it secured or
unsecured – is the amount of the debt. The two – the value of property and the amount
of debt – are unrelated. This is basic to accounting, whether one looks at Generally

162. E.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 992 So. 2d 395, 397 (Fla. App. 1 Dist. 2008); Herrera v. Herrera, 895
So.2d 1171, 1174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); Thomas v. Thomas, 796 So. 2d 1092 (Fla. App. 5 Dist.
2001).
163. E.g., Turner v. Turner, 529 So. 2d 1138, 1139 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Shephard v. Shephard,
526 So.2d 95, 98 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Ingram v. Ingram, 379 So. 2d 995, 996 (Fla. 1980); Pfleger
v. Pfleger, 558 So. 2d 198, 199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
164. E.g., Kaaa v. Kaaa, 9 So. 3d 756, 758 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Reyes v. Reyes, 714 So. 2d 646,
647 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (referring to “the mortgage [being] serviced” as an enhancement).
165. E.g., Speilberger v. Speilberger, 712 So. 2d 835, 836 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
166. The “right” has no value independent of the debt. All other factors being equal, a $50,000 secured
debt is less valuable than a $100,000 secured debt.
167. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE ART. § 2981 (West, Westlaw through urgency legislation through Ch. 5 of
2019 Reg. Sess.) (defining conditional sales); FLA. STAT. ch. 520 (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess.
of the 26th Legis., 2019) (concerning retail installment sales).
168. Even seller-financed transactions are not typically conditional sales. The seller transfers title to
the purchaser who grants a mortgage to secure the debt from the purchaser to the seller.
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Accepted Accounting Principles,169 International Financial Reporting Standards,170
SEC rules,171 or even common Family Law forms.172 Assets appear on the left side
of a balance sheet, unreduced by any debt – secured or not. Debts appear on the right
side, unaffected in amount173 by whether they are secured.174
A consolidated spousal balance sheet showing encumbered and
unencumbered assets plus secured and unsecured liabilities would appear as follows:

Consolidated Spousal FMV Balance Sheet
Assets
Home

$500,000

Miscellaneous 200,000
(unencumbered)

Liabilities
Secured Debt
Accrued interest
Accrued Taxes

Unsecured Debt
125,000
(including capitalized interest)
Net Worth

Total Assets

$700,000

$350,000
1,500
3,000

$220,500

Liabilities Plus Net Worth $700,000

169. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION, 21020. Offsetting liabilities against assets is generally forbidden; however, U.S. GAAP permits it in limited
circumstances. See http://accountinginfo.com/financial-accounting-standards/asc-200/210-20offsetting.htm.
170. Standard 1.32 of IFRS permits limited offsetting for some financial instruments. See, IFRS
FOUNDATION, Standard 1.32, Financial Instruments, https://www.ifrs.org/issued-standards/list-ofstandards/ias-32-financial-instruments-presentation/.
171. See 17 C.F.R. § 210.5-02 (2012) (general balance-sheet rules). But see § 210.6-05 (providing
limited use of net asset reporting for some subsidiaries of regulated investment companies).
172. See Florida Family Law Financial Affidavit, available at https://caseman.flcourts.org/forms/
902c.aspx (requiring the listing of assets and liabilities separately, rather than net).
173. A typical balance sheet groups secured and unsecured debts separately. The relative categories
affect the obligor’s creditworthiness differently; thus they affect his/her financial well-being differently.
Nevertheless, the existence of security or the lack thereof has nothing to do with the amount of the debt,
let alone the security value.
174. From the creditor viewpoint, a secured debt would typically have more value than a similar-inamount unsecured debt of the same obligor. This may affect how the creditor might report the debt (an
asset from his viewpoint) on his own balance sheet. The creditor’s viewpoint, however, is irrelevant to
the obligor’s viewpoint, which is unaffected by the existence of security or lack thereof, with the exception
that a balance sheet should list secured debts separately from unsecured debts because the information is
important to creditors and investors.
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The home has a $500,000 fair market value. Neither secured nor unsecured
debts affect the value. The same is true of the miscellaneous unencumbered assets
(such as cash, stocks, and furniture): their value is independent of the liabilities.
Suppose the spouses used $6000 cash (part of miscellaneous assets) to pay
four debts: 1) $500 secured debt principal, 2) $1500 accrued interest, 3) $3000
accrued property tax, and 4) $1000 unsecured debt. The accounting entries would
be:

Consolidated Spousal General Journal
Debit
Secured Debt
Accrued Interest
Accrued Tax Liability
Unsecured Debt

Credit

$ 500
1,500
3,000
1,000

Cash (Miscellaneous Assets)

$6,000

Because the Consolidated Statement included accrued interest and taxes, no
debit would appear to “expenses”: that would have appeared in a prior entry. Also,
no entry would affect the House or Miscellaneous Assets other than the amount
expended. Hence the Balance Sheet, immediately following the payments would be:

Consolidated Spousal FMV Balance Sheet
Assets
Home

Miscellaneous
(unencumbered)

$500,000

$194,000

Liabilities
Secured Debt
Accrued interest
Accrued Taxes

Unsecured Debt
$124,000
(including capitalized interest)
Net Worth

Total Assets

$694,000

$349,500
0
0

$220,500

Liabilities Plus Net Worth $694,000

The house would remain at $500,000. Payment of secured purchase-money
debt principal would not affect its value. Similarly, payment of secured accrued
interest and secured accrued taxes would also not affect its value. Likewise, the

310

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 49; No. 2

reduction in unsecured debts would not affect the value of either the house or the
unencumbered assets; however, the expenditure of $6000 in unencumbered assets
reduced the amount of those assets. Most importantly, net worth did not change: it
remained at $220,500.
Both the California and Florida Courts ignore this analysis by considering
a debt payment to be a property enhancement. But, per almost universal accounting
rules,175 no asset appears net of liabilities it secures: that would require moving
liabilities to the left side of the balance sheet.
Hence, one does not directly affect the value of property by reducing or
increasing the amount of debt the property secures. Indirectly, the existence of debt
– both secured and unsecured – affects the creditworthiness of the borrower/property
owner. That, in turn, affects his/her financial well-being, and thus affects his/her
motivation to sell, to buy, or to hold. This motivation change – if apparent to potential
buyers – will affect their own behavior. For example, if they view the seller as
“highly motivated” because he/she is deep in debt, they may offer less, which means
– at least to them – the property has less value. Because secured debt is more apparent
to buyers than unsecured debt, it arguably has a greater impact. Such an indirect
effect on property value, however, does not remotely justify the notion that debt
payments somehow “enhance” property. If so, the same could be said of the owner
getting a raise, winning the lottery, or paying unsecured, unrelated liabilities: all of
these affect a seller’s motivation and, if known to buyers, their willingness to pay a
high price.
Tax law correctly treats assets and liabilities – secured or unsecured –
separately.176 Bankruptcy law treats them separately as well.177 Security changes the
ranking of the creditor; however, it has nothing to do with the value of the assets.
Tort law treats assets and debts separately: a property owner is responsible for
damages caused by his property – but the lienholder is not.178 Ad Valorem tax law
treats assets and debts separately, as well: the tax appraisal on a house is not a
function of the owner’s debts.179 Yet, oddly, family law often blurs the legal lines
between assets and liabilities.

175. See supra notes 169–71 (outlining the limited exceptions).
176. Crane v. Comm’r, 331 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1947) (“The only relevant definitions of ‘property’ to be
found in the principal standard dictionaries are the two favored by the Commissioner, i.e., either that
‘property’ is the physical thing which is a subject of ownership, or that it is the aggregate of the owner’s
rights to control and dispose of that thing. ‘Equity’ is not given as a synonym, nor do either of the
foregoing definitions suggest that it could be correctly so used. Indeed, ‘equity’ is defined as ‘the value
of a property above the total of the liens.’ The contradistinction could hardly be more pointed. Strong
countervailing considerations would be required to support a contention that Congress, in using the word
‘property’, meant ‘equity’, or that we should impute to it the intent to convey that meaning.”) (footnotes
omitted).
177. Form 106 A/B requires a list of property, while Schedule D requires a list of debts. Schedule A/B
provides: “Do not deduct secured claims or exemptions. Put the amount of any secured claims on Schedule
D: Creditors Who Have Claims Secured by Property.” FED. R. BANKR. P. Official Form B106A/B.
178. See Barry S. Marks, Lessor Liability and the Federal Leased Vehicle Liability Act, J. EQUIP.
LEASE FIN., Winter 2006, at 2.
179. E.g., Fla. Stat. Ann § 193.011 (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 26th Legis., 2019).
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(B). A Financial Illustration.
As shown above, interest obligations and principal obligations are both
liabilities: they both appear on the right side of the Balance Sheet. Financially,
payment of one does not differ from the payment of the other. From the viewpoint
of the non-owner-spouse, the payment of either involves an outward cash flow that
diminishes the marital/community assets. Consider this four-part example:
Example 3: A enters the marriage with four $100,000 obligations,
each bearing 5% nominal annual interest, compounded or paid
monthly:
 $100,000, with $105,116.19 due in one year including
interest.
 $100,000, with $659.96 due monthly for twenty years.
 $100,000, with a $271,264.03 balloon payment due in
twenty years.
 $100,000, with $416.67 interest due monthly for twenty
years and $100,000 principal due in twenty years.
B earns a large income and the parties use the proceeds to pay the
obligations. Additionally, A enters the marriage with an I.R.A.
containing $100,000 earning 5% compounded monthly.
Nominally, the four loans appear different: the first involves a $105,116.19
cash outlay,180 the second, $158,390.40 total cash outlays,181 the third a $271,264.03
cash outlay, and the fourth $200,000.80 total cash outlays.182 Yet, all four loans are
financially identical in a present value sense: they each involve $100,000 principal
and a 5% nominal interest rate. Assuming that rate is appropriate for all periods and
all obligations, each loan has a $100,000 present value and a $271,264.03 future
value (to the holder). Likewise, in terms of opportunity cost to the marital
assets/community, the loans are the same, again assuming a constant interest rate.183
In each case, but for the payment, the marital/community assets in twenty years
would be $271,264.03 greater.
Using the logic184 of all analyzed formulas, the value of the resulting
marital/community asset – would be the same: $100,000.185 In contrast, using the
proposed formula, the result would be the full $271,264.03. Money inherently has

180. $100,000 borrowed today at 5% nominal interest compounded monthly equals $105,116.19 in
one year.
181. $659.96 times 12 payments per year times 20 years equals $158,390.40.
182. $416.67 times 12 payments per year times 20 years equals $100,000.80 plus the final payments
equals $200,000.80.
183. Changing that assumption and introducing a changing market rate of interest would not alter the
character of the opportunity cost, though it could alter the volume. Critically, a discussion of whether to
include interest payments in a reimbursement obligation involves the character of the payments, but has
nothing to do with the amount.
184. All state formulas fundamentally rest on the notion that funds earned during a marriage are
marital; thus, in all four situations, the resulting assets should have the same value because all four
scenarios have the same present value or future value.
185. $100,000 would be the principal paid. Many states inflate this relative to the appreciation and
leverage percentage of the property securing the loan. That could result in a number greater or less than
$271,264.03.
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value over time, whether it pays principal or interest or provides marital necessities
or luxuries. Logically, B in the examples would easily see the loss of $271,264.03 in
relation to the third loan because she would be transferring that amount of funds in
one payment. B would also easily see A’s separate account increase in value from
$100,000 to $271,264.03.
The interest accumulations on the separate I.R.A. account are just as real –
and spend the same – as the original principal contribution; however, states which
treat income from separate property as separate,186 would treat the interest
accumulations differently than the accumulated interest obligations. A would keep
the $171,264.03 interest the account earned, but B would not receive reimbursement
for the $171,264.03 interest paid.187
Similarly, in states that treat income from managed separate property as
producing marital assets, the result would differ but the interest treatment would
remain inconsistent. B would share in the $171,264.03 interest accumulated,188
though B would not receive reimbursement for the the $171,264.03 interest paid.189
But, money being fungible, what difference does it make whether the interest results
in an accumulated asset or an accumulated obligation? Certainly no apparent
difference. Hence the proposed formula treats interest payments the same as
principal payments, contrary to all nineteen states analyzed.
ii. Imputed Value of the Contributed Property
The second reason given by the California Court is that considering the
interest would justify imputing the rental value for the use of the home as an offset.
Facially, that is a compelling point; however, it does not hold up to logical analysis.
Consider two points:
1. In Example 3, A voluntarily contributed use of the home to the
family/community unit. Absent a marriage contract requiring
reimbursement, no reason exists for reimbursement when viewing
the use of the home in isolation from the payment of any debt
secured by the home. Few spouses seek rent on cars, boats,
furniture, jewelry or other items brought into a marriage for
common use. Other than the value involved, a house does not
logically differ from other assets.
2. The inevitable result of the Court’s logic – positing a rental
offset for reimbursable interest payments – suggests the imputed
rental value varies depending on the terms of a loan secured by the
home.
Consider three alternative examples:

186. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 770(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through urgency legislation through Ch. 5 of
2019 Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. §123.130 (West, Westlaw though May 15, 2019).
187. E.g., In re Marriage of Moore, 618 P.2d 208, 211 (Cal. 1980); Malmquist v. Malmquist, 792 P.2d
372, 382–83 (Nev. 1990).
188. E.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.002 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of the 86th Legis.);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.075(6)(a)(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 26th Legis., 2019)
(providing that Florida income from managed separate property produces a marital asset).
189. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §3.402(a); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.075(6)(a)(1)(c).
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Example 4: Spouse A enters a marriage owning a $100,000 home,
subject to a thirty-year 5% mortgage loan of $80,000 with monthly
payments of $536.80.
Example 5: Spouse B enters a marriage owning a $100,000 home,
subject to a five-year 5% mortgage loan of $20,000 with monthly
payments of $377.40.
Example 6: Spouse C enters a marriage owning a $100,000 home
but owing no debt.
Using the logic of courts/statutes that ignore interest, the following
anomalous results occur:
Example 4: In the first month of marriage, the imputed rental
value of A’s home would be $416.67 – the amount of interest owed
on the loan. During the 60th month, the imputed rental value would
be $383.26 and during the 360th month, the rental value would be
merely $2.33. Thereafter, it would be zero.
Example 5: In the first month of marriage, the imputed rental
value of B’s home – identical to A’s home – would be $83.33.
During the 60th month it would be $1.57. Thereafter, it would be
zero.
Example 6: In all months of the marriage, the imputed rental value
of C’s home – identical to those of A and B – would be zero.
In reality, whatever the rental values of the homes, they would have nothing
to do with the debt the homes secure, let alone the interest paid, if any. Market forces
would dictate the rental value. For courts – or legislatures – to impute it as a function
of an irrelevant factor (secured loan interest) is not justifiable.
Perhaps the consistent confusion results because interest is both a balance
sheet liability and an income statement expense. Interest accrues over time,
producing an interest expense debit and an interest liability credit. Payment involves
the liability, not the expense. One never pays an expense; instead, one pays incurred
or accrued liabilities.190 States rationally consider liability payments labeled
“principal,” but they routinely ignore liability payments labeled “interest.” They
likely do so because they mistakenly focus on the income statement interest expense
rather than the balance sheet interest liability.
iii. Repair and Maintenance Costs
Maintaining a home is expensive. Many advisors suggest saving 1-3% of
the home value per year to maintain the home in good condition.191 Some years result
in low costs, such as some paint or a broken-window repair. Other years prompt
extensive costs, such as new appliances, flooring, or driveway restoration. Repairs
unquestionably affect the house value because without them, it would deteriorate.
But, generally one thinks of them as “every-day” expenses rather than
improvements. They are part of the costs – including insurance, insect treatments,
190. Assuming accrual accounting, as opposed to the cash method, which does not clearly reflect
income and should not be used.
191. How to Budget for Home Maintenance Costs, HGTV, https://www.hgtv.com/design/realestate/how-to-budget-for-home-maintenance-costs (last visited Apr. 20, 2019).
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and lawn maintenance – that accompany living in a house. As such, they are logically
and traditionally treated as marital/community expenses when attributable to the
family home. Hence, they are not traditionally reimbursable even if attributable to a
house owned by one spouse.192
iv. Property Taxes.
Property taxes on separate property frequently present an issue when paid
with marital/community funds. Traditionally, they are not reimbursable193 and the
payment of them does not create a marital/community asset. That result seems
correct.
Annual property taxes are not a liability brought into the marriage, except
for any date-of-marriage unpaid tax. Instead, governments assess them annually. If
they are unpaid, the owner risks losing the property; thus, they clearly impact
ownership. But, as a cost roughly equal to the cost of needed annual government
services, they more resemble repair and maintenance.
v. Improvements.
Improvements affecting the house value – such as a garage enclosure –
create a marital/community asset.194 However, at least some states apply a valuation
formula that differs from the formula used for secured debt payments.195 As a result,
they are beyond the scope of this article.
D. Topics for Later Discussion
Important issues mostly deferred to later articles include:
 The use of marital funds to pay separate debts secured by the
marital home if the home loses value.
 The use of marital funds to pay unsecured separate debts such as
student loans.
The Florida statute speaks of an “enhancement in value,”196 which would
seem to require a positive number. Unfortunately, since 2007, many homes have lost
value;197 hence, Courts will eventually need to address what to do, if anything, if
marital funds service separate debt secured by depreciated property. The Proposed
Formula would require reimbursement, but would use a market interest rate rather
than one related to the security.

192. E.g., Moore, 618 P.2d at 211.
193. Id.
194. E.g., Kaaa v. Kaaa, 58 So. 3d 867, 868 (Fla. 2010).
195. E.g., Kaaa v. Kaaa, 9 So. 3d 756 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (applying a per-square-foot value for
a garage enclosure, a finding the Supreme Court did not disturb but which differs from the Florida
appreciation formula used for debt payments), decision quashed by Kaaa v. Kaaa, 58 So. 3d 867, 868 (Fla.
2010).
196. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.075(6)(a)(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 26th Legis.,
2019).
197. E.g., TEXAS FAM. CODE ANN. §3.402(a) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of the 86th
Legis.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.075(6)(a)(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 26th Legis.,
2019).
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One Florida case dealt with an analogous problem, although it did so
confusingly. The Fifth D.C.A., in 2016,198 considered a loss incurred on a marital
asset that was partially funded with nonmarital debt. The Court confusingly allocated
the “loss” to the husband (who incurred the debt by forging wife’s signature) as a
marital liability. Because a loss is an income statement term, it has nothing to do with
a liability, which is a balance sheet term. Husband paid the loan using marital
funds;199 hence, no liability existed to allocate. Whether the Court anticipated
Husband reimbursing Wife for the loss was unclear. Perhaps the Court intended that
Husband be awarded a smaller portion of the marital assets.
Florida has no authority requiring a spouse to reimburse the other for the
payment of unsecured debts with marital funds. Several states, however, require such
reimbursement.200
II. ILLUSTRATIONS: THE MECHANICS
This Part focuses on one issue: the use of marital funds to pay separate debt
securing a separately-owned marital home that appreciates during the marriage. To
illustrate the mechanical focus, this article uses eight separate formulae:
 The California Moore/New Mexico/Florida formula.
 The Kentucky/Virginia/Maryland/Missouri/Georgia/Delaware/
North Carolina “source of funds” formula
 The Nevada/Maine/Minnesota formula.
 The Florida Kaaa formula.
 The Texas/Louisiana/Idaho reimbursement formula.
 The Pennsylvania/Colorado simple division of appreciation
formula.
 The Illinois Transmutation assumption without modification.
 The proposed Economic Reimbursement Formula.
It applies them to three examples, high-leverage, extremely-high-leverage,
and low-leverage. Each example has three scenarios: high-interest/low-appreciation,
low-interest/high-appreciation and a neutral example in which the interest rate and
appreciation rate are the same. The high-leverage/bad-investment scenario has tables
for 20-year, 30-year, and 10-year marriages.
The examples – with the three scenarios – illustrate the effectiveness of the
proposed formula as well as the weaknesses of existing formulas. The results and
conclusions vary widely by state: some consistently produce very low returns for
non-owner spouses, while others often produce excessive returns. Overall, none of
the nineteen states analyzed consistently produce a reasonable non-owner-spouse
return; however, most do so at least occasionally.

198. Mills v. Mills, 192 So.3d 515, 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
199. Id. Husband and Wife had an investment account which lost approximately $250,000. Id. at 517.
Husband forged Wife’s signature on a loan for $100,000 to partially fund the account. Id. Because he
apparently used margin trading, the broker likely called the loan as the investments lost value, leaving no
liability. The Court’s statement of the facts was woefully insufficient.
200. E.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §3.402(a)(1) (providing a specific rule for payment of unsecured
liabilities); LA. CIV. CODE Ann. art. 2364 (West, Westlaw through 2018 3d Extraordinary Sess.)
(generally applying to the payment of non-community liabilities, whether secured or unsecured).
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Following the eleven illustrated calculations are state-by-state observations
and conclusions.
A. Example 7: High-Leverage
Three scenarios for the following example are realistic and within the scope
of this article:201
1.
2.
3.

Bad-Investment: The house appreciates at an average
3.25%, slower than the 5% loan rate.
Neutral-Investment: The house appreciates at exactly
5%, equal to the loan rate.
Good-Investment: The house appreciates at an average
10%, exceeding the 5% loan rate.

Consider the following example facts:
Pre-marriage, A owns a house with a $100,000 date-of-marriage
fair market value and owes an $80,000 5% NAI202 secured loan,

201. Two other realistic scenarios are:
1. The house loses value but the value exceeds the remaining debt.
2. The house loses value and the debt exceeds the value of the house.
The terminology focuses on the portion financed and ignores associated tax benefits. Although potential
home-ownership tax benefits – particularly with financing – can be material, they do not alter the analysis,
although they may shift the line drawing delineating the bad, neutral, and good categories. The analysis
also ignores non-quantifiable aspects of home ownership, as well as (at least initially) any imputed value
attributable to the use of the home. The terminology – bad, neutral, and good – describing the investment
is useful in analyzing the three formulas.
The analysis considers the investment return for the non-financed portion; however, it ignores any “cost
of capital” attributable to that portion. Because the non-financed portion remains “separate” and because
the house appreciation is necessarily uniform – it does not vary between the financed portion and the nonfinanced portion – the owner-spouse’s investment cost and opportunity cost are irrelevant. Further, any
such costs are nonmarital and thus not relevant to the legal classification of marital assets and liabilities.
The costs could be relevant to the equitable distribution of assets and liabilities, but that is beyond the
scope of this article.
I.R.C. section 163 allows deductions for interest paid or accrued. I.R.C. § 163 (West 2008). Section
163(h)(2)(D) allows a qualified-residence interest. § 163(h)(2)(D). Considering the $1 million loan
limitation, section 163(h)(3)(B)(ii), as well as the “itemized” nature of personal interest, section 63
(subjecting it to a large standard deduction), post-2017 home-financing tax benefits are small. §§
163(h)(3)(B)(ii), 63.
202. A nominal annual interest rate is uncompounded. All finance formulae use a periodic rate in the
algebraic formula (though they might have an internal algebraic conversion component from an effective
rate or an annual rate to the periodic). The nominal rate equals the periodic rate times the number of
periods per year. Because the nominal rate is uncompounded, it can be misleading, but exists for
convenience. To obtain the needed periodic rate, divide the nominal rate by the number of periods; in
contrast, to obtain the periodic rate from an effective rate, one must first convert the effective rate to a
nominal rate. With compounding or payments more frequently than once annually, the nominal rate will
always be lower than the effective rate (assuming positive rates of interest); as a result, lenders have an
incentive to emphasize a nominal rate while borrowers (for example, banks selling certificates of deposit)
have an incentive to emphasize an effective rate.
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with 30 years of $429.46203 monthly payments remaining. A and
B reside in the house and marital/community assets service the
loan. Twenty years later, they divorce. The loan has $40,488.70
principal remaining.204
Bad-Investment-Scenario Summary. If a spouse invests unwisely – badly
– he/she should logically receive a lower return on marital assets used than should
the non-owner “innocent” spouse: the one who controls the investment should suffer
the investment’s negative consequences, if any, at least to a greater extent than
should the one who lacks power. Awarding the owner-spouse with a return higher
than the security’s return arguably rewards poor decisions.
Neutral-Investment-Scenario Summary. Logically, the NeutralInvestment Scenario should act as a “control”: it assumes the home and all
investments return exactly the same as the loan rate. In such circumstances, the
outcome should be the same regardless whether the owner-spouse is highly
leveraged or lightly so and it should produce the same return to both spouses. Indeed,
it should provide the same return even if the owner-spouse, in the alternative, chose
to invest his/her down-payment elsewhere and then the spouses together purchased
and financed the home. Formula drafters should be concerned if their formula
produces a material non-neutral result in such a scenario.
Good-Investment-Scenario Summary. Logically, if the debtor-spouse
produces a high return using marital assets, he/she should either be treated the same
as the non-debtor spouse or perhaps even be rewarded with a larger return. The
Proposed Formula can produce either result, depending on the interest rate used.
Legislators and courts should pay close attention to the relative results of their
formulas in such cases.
a. Scenario One: High-Leverage/Bad-Investment
With slow appreciation of 3.25% – relative to the 5% loan rate – the house
would be worth $191,385.85205 in twenty years, with equity of $150,897.15.206 The

203. The $429.46 amortization payment =

where n = the number of periods, i = the

nominal annual interest rate, and PV = the present value (the amount borrowed). In the example, n = 360,
i = 5%, and PV = $80,000. A Hewlett-Packard 10Bii calculator computes the payment as $429.457. To
reproduce this number, set P/YR as 12, mode as END, I/YR as 5, PV as 80,000, FV as zero, and solve for
PMT.
204. Amortizing a loan involves reducing the principal by a portion of each payment. That portion
equals the nominal rate divided by 12 and multiplied by the principal owed at the end of the prior period.
A HP 10Bii calculator produces a $40,488.70 principal amount after 20 years. To reproduce this number,
set P/YR as 12, N (the number of payments) as 240, mode as END, PV as 80,000, I/YR as 5, PMT as
429.46, and solve for FV.
205. The $191,385.85 future value =

1

, where PV = the present value ($100,000), i = the

nominal rate divided by 12 (3.25 /12 = .2708333) and n = the number of compounding periods (20 years
times 12 months). An HP 10Bii calculator produces a future value of $191,385.85 after 20 years, using a
rounding assumption to ten decimals. To reproduce this number, set P/YR as 12, N as 240, mode as END,
PV as 100,000, I/YR as 3.25, PMT as 0, and solve for FV.
206. $191,385.85 fair market value minus the $40,488.70 principal remaining after 20 years.
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property’s return on investment would be 1.708%207 NAI or 1.721% at an effective208
interest rate. The low return results from the relatively high cost of capital, 5%, as
compared to the lower property appreciation of 3.25%. The change in equity would
be 10.146%.209
The following chart shows what each examined formula would produce for
the non-owner-spouse as well as for the owner-spouse. It also shows their respective
investment returns, which provide critical insight; indeed, stating the reimbursement
or asset distribution as a return on investment seems the most logical method of
comparing it to the appreciation of the house. Each return appears as a nominal
interest rate and is thus uncompounded.210 Arguably, A made the bad investment and
should suffer relatively more (or benefit less) than B, the non-owner. Indeed, with
the Economic Reimbursement Formula, B receives a 3.25% return equal to the house
appreciation, while A has a paltrier 0.713% return. A is the one who incurred the
relatively high interest loan in a high-leverage situation and thus appropriately
receives a lower return relative to B.
Readers should pay attention to formulas that produce a non-owner-spouse
return lower than the 3.25% property appreciation, as well as to those which produce
a higher than 3.25% return to the owner-spouse. The generally stated goal is for the
non-owner-spouse to share in the appreciation; hence, if he/she receives a return
lower than the house appreciation, he/she would appear to be shortchanged. Returns
to the owner-spouse exceeding the house appreciation effectively reward that spouse.
That is arguably a wise result in the “good-investment” scenarios, but an unwise one
in the “bad-investment” scenarios.
Readers should also pay very close attention to negative returns for the nonowner-spouse, especially whenever the owner-spouse receives a positive return.
Such results are arguably strong evidence of the non-owner being shortchanged.
Negative returns occur because the marital asset/community property payments
include both interest and principal. Even if the state does not consider the interest
relevant, the cash outflow includes interest, which makes the interest relevant to any
calculator computing an investment return. Had the parties deposited the $429.46
207. The return on investment is the nominal annual rate (compounded monthly to correspond with
monthly payments) of growth in the down-payment plus monthly payments. Using an HP 10Bii calculator,
set PV as 20,000 (the down-payment), PMT as 429.46 (to reflect investment of the monthly loan payment),
N as 240 (to reflect twenty years), mode as END (to reflect payments being made at the end of each
period), and FV as -150,897.15 (the equity in twenty years) stated as a negative number to represent the
cash flow directionally opposite of the investment, and solve for the NAI or I/YR (nominal interest per
year). The result is 1.70801%. Converted to an effective rate, the result is 1.72144%.
208. The effective interest rate equals the nominal rate compounded for one year. For a self-amortizing
obligation, it is not internally accurate because the debtor typically pays all interest periodically; hence,
the instrument’s interest rate does not internally compound. Yet, from the perspective of each party, it
necessarily compounds. The lender invests each payment somewhere and produces what is ultimately a
compounded rate. Likewise, the debtor, by making the periodic payments, loses the use of the funds for
part of the year, which effectively compounds his/her cost. The two perspectives need not – and likely do
not – use the same compounding rate. Nevertheless, an effective rate for a self-amortizing loan produced
by using the internal rate provides useful information.
209. N=240, PV = 20,000, FV = -150,907, PMT = zero, I/yr = 10.14699%.
210. The charts use the NAI uncompounded rate of return for a fair comparison to the 5% NAI loan
rate and the 3.25% NAI house return on the house. Comparing the effective return to the nominal rates
would not be proper.
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monthly payments into an account bearing interest equal to the 3.25% house
appreciation, the resulting marital asset would have been $144,910.41,211 or
$72,455.20 for each. The green boxes for the proposed Economic Reimbursement
Formula provide the non-owner-spouse with a return equal to the 3.25% house
appreciation, arguably the fairest result.212 Grey boxes provide the non-owner-spouse
with a return within 125 basis points of the house appreciation, arguably a defensibly
close result. White boxes are examples of a “shortchanged” non-owner-spouse.
Table 1: High-Leverage/Bad-Investment/20-Year Marriage213
= $100,000;
= $80,000; 30-year loan @ 5%
NonOwnerNAI; $429.46 payment ($214.73 per spouse);
Owner
Spouse
= $40,488.70 ($39,511.30 principal paid); end
Spouse
mode.
= $191,385.85 (3.25% NAI return); equity =
$150,897.15.
California Moore/New Mexico/Florida

Kentucky/Delaware/Virginia/Georgia/M
issouri/Maryland/North Carolina

ROI214
37,810.11
-3.286%

ROI215
113,087.04
3.399%

50,092.53
-0.286%

100,804.62
2.577%

211. That amount ignores tax consequences, which is relevant for two reasons. First, to some extent
the interest would have generated a tax benefit, likely shared by both spouses. Adjusting the return for the
tax benefit is arguably proper; however, it is likely immaterial: all returns, the return on the house, as well
as the return for each spouse on their respective contributions would be affected. Second, many taxdeferred investments are available, including retirement accounts and state/local bonds; hence, had the
spouses not invested in the house, they plausibly would have invested in another tax-deferred investment.
See I.R.C. §§103, 401, 403 (West 2008). To reproduce the number using an HP 10Bii calculator, set N as
240, I/YR as 3.25, mode as END, PV as 0, PMT as 429.46, and solve for FV.
212. All formulas evaluated – other than the Texas/Louisiana one – use the house appreciation as a
measuring factor.
213. V1 = house date-of-marriage fair market value.
V2 = house date-of-separation fair market value.
D1 = date-of-marriage secured debt.
D2 = date-of-separation secured debt.
MA = value of the marital asset/community property resulting from the scenario.
214. ROI = return-on-investment for the non-owner-spouse. For the non-owner-spouse, set N as, 0 as
the PV as 0 (representing no initial down-payment by the non-owner), PMT as 214.73 (the non-owner’s
one-half share of the monthly payment), FV as

(the non-owner-spouse’s amount computed under each

formula), and solve for I/YR for the nominal annual interest rate of return.
215. ROI = return-on-investment for the owner-spouse. For the owner-spouse, set N as 240, PV as
20,000 (representing the initial down-payment by the owner-spouse), PMT as 214.73, FV as
(the owner-spouse’s share under each formula), and solve for I/YR for the nominal ROI.
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Nevada/ Maine/Minnesota

56,311.19
0.877%

94,585.96
2.114%

Florida Kaaa

36,065.64
-3.822%

114,831.51
3.507%

Texas/Louisiana/Idaho

19,755.65
-11.834%
45,692.93
-1.233%

131,141.50
4.433%
105,204.22
2.886%

75,448.58
3.616%
72,455.20
3.250%

75,448.57
0.414%
78,441.95
0.713%

Pennsylvania/Colorado

Illinois Transmutation
Economic Reimbursement Formula

Table 2: High-Leverage/Bad-Investment/10-Year Marriage216
= $100,000;
= $80,000; 30-year loan @ 5%
NonOwnerNAI; $429.46 payment ($214.73 per spouse);
Owner
Spouse
= $65,073.23 ($14,926.77 principal paid); end
Spouse
mode.
= $138,342.28 (3.25% NAI return); equity =
$73,269.05.
ROI
ROI
California Moore/New Mexico/Florida
10,325.02
62,944.03
-22.339%
4.321%
Kentucky/Delaware/Virginia/Georgia/Missouri/ 31,313.24
41,955.81
Maryland/North Carolina
3.815%
-1.225%
Nevada/ Maine/Minnesota
Florida Kaaa
Texas/Louisiana/Idaho
Pennsylvania/Colorado
Illinois Transmutation
Economic Reimbursement Formula

22,800.30
-2.518%
7,463.39217
-33.353%
7,463.39
-33.353%
19,171.14
-6.279%
36,634.53
6.738%
30,399.64
3.250%

50,468.75
1.352%
65,805.66
4.905%
65,805.66
4.905%
54,097.91
2.298%
36,634.52
-3.183%
42,869.41
-0.920%

216. See supra note 210 for definitions; see supra Table 1 for formulas.
217. The formula results in a negative number because it combines the active and passive appreciation.
In such a case, a court would surely merely consider the active appreciation as a marital asset without a
decrease because of the minimal passive appreciation.
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Table 3: High-Leverage/Bad-Investment/30-Year Marriage218
= $100,000;
= $80,000; 30-year loan @ 5%
NonOwnerNAI; $429.46 payment ($214.73 per spouse);
Owner
Spouse
= $0 ($80,000 principal paid); end mode.
Spouse
= $264,767.55 (3.25% NAI return); equity =
$264,767.55.
ROI
ROI
California Moore/New Mexico/Florida
105,907.02 158,860.53
2.006%
2.550%
Kentucky/Delaware/Virginia/Georgia/Missouri/ 105,907.02 158,860.53
Maryland/North Carolina
2.006%
2.550%
Nevada/ Maine/Minnesota
Florida Kaaa
Texas/Louisiana/Idaho
Pennsylvania/Colorado
Illinois Transmutation
Economic Reimbursement Formula

105,907.02
2.006%
105,907.02
2.006%
40,000
-5.01%
82,383.78
0.421%
132,383.78
3.327%
130,635.82
3.250%

158,860.53
2.550%
158,860.53
2.550%
224,767.55
4.905%
182,383.77
4.199%
132,383.77
1.636%
134,131.73
1.703%

b. Scenario Two: High-Leverage/Neutral-House-Appreciation
With “neutral” appreciation of 5% – equal to the 5% loan rate – the house
would be worth $271,264.03 in twenty years,219 with equity of $230,755.33.220 The
property’s investment return would be 5%221 NAI. The change in equity would be
12.269%.222
Readers should pay attention to non-owner-spouse negative returns, as well
as returns which materially diverge from the 5% house appreciation and cost of

218. See supra note 210 for definitions; see supra Table 1 for formulas.
219. The $271,264.03 future value =

1

, where PV = the present value ($100,000), i = the

nominal rate divided by 12 (5/12 = .41666667) and n = the number of compounding periods (20 years
times 12 months). Using an HP10Bii calculator and inputting a 100,000 present value, a zero payment,
the 240 periods, a 5% NAI produces a $271,264.03 future value.
220. $271,264.03 fair market value minus the $40,488.70 principal remaining after 20 years.
221. Using an HP 10Bii calculator, and inputting a 20,000 present value (the down-payment), a 429.46
payment, 240 periods, a -230,775.33 future value ($271,264.03 minus $40,488.70, the equity in twenty
years stated as a negative number to represent the cash flow), solving for the interest rate produces an NAI
of 5.000%. The effective rate is 5.116%.
222. N=240, PV = 20,000, FV = -230,775.33, PMT = zero (irrelevant), I/re = 12.269%.
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capital. Formulas that produce a non-owner return with-in 125 basis points of the 5%
house appreciation appear in grey.
Table 4: High-Leverage/Neutral-Investment/20-Year Marriage223
= $100,000;
= $80,000; 30-year loan @ 5%
NonOwnerNAI; $429.46 payment ($214.73 per spouse);
Owner
Spouse
= $40,488.70 ($39,511.30 principal paid); end
Spouse
mode.
= $271,264.03 (5.00% NAI return); equity =
$230,775.33.
ROI
ROI
California Moore/New Mexico/Florida
53,588.97
177,185.36
0.390%
6.454%
Kentucky/Delaware/Virginia/Georgia/Missouri/ 76,609.26
154,166.07
Maryland/North Carolina
3.753%
5.530%
Nevada/ Maine/Minnesota
88,261.26
142,514.07
5.000%
5.000%
Florida Kaaa
68,016.91
162,758.42
2.671%
5.892%
Texas/Louisiana/Idaho
19,755.65
211,019.68
-11.834%
7.589%
Pennsylvania/Colorado
85,632.02
145,143.31
4.736%
5.124%
Illinois Transmutation
115,387.67 115,387.66
7.254%
3.541%
Economic Reimbursement Formula
88,269.48
142,505.85
5.000%
5.000%
c. Scenario Three: High-Leverage/Good-Investment
With “high” appreciation of 10% – twice the 5% loan rate – the house would
be worth $732,807.36 in twenty years,224 with equity of $692,318.66.225 The
property’s investment return would be 12.475%226 NAI.
Readers should pay attention to non-owner-spouse negative returns, as well
as returns that materially diverge from the 10% house appreciation. Formulas
producing a non-owner return with-in 125 basis points of the 10% house appreciation
appear in grey. Readers should also compare the non-owner return to that of the
owner: in many states, the scenario oddly produces a higher non-owner return.
223. See supra note 210 for definitions.
224. The $732,807.36 future value =

1

, where PV = the present value ($100,000), i = the

nominal rate divided by 12 (10/12 = .41666667) and n = the number of compounding periods (20 years
times 12 months). Using an HP10Bii calculator and inputting a present value of $100,000, a payment
(PMT) of zero, the number of periods as 240, an NAI of 10% produces a $732,807.36 future value.
225. $732,807.36 fair market value minus the $40,488.70 principal remaining after 20 years.
226. Using an HP 10Bii calculator, and inputting a 20,000 present value (the down-payment), a 429.46
payment, 240 periods, a -692,318.66 future value ($732,807.70 minus $40,488.70, the equity in twenty
years stated as a negative number to represent the cash flow), solving for the interest rate produces a
12.475% NAI. The effective rate is 13.213%.
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Logically, the owner-spouse – who made a comparatively good investment – should
receive a higher return: he/she not only accepted the risk of loss, but he/she also
produced a strong return. Formulas that result in a higher return to the non-owner
arguably punish the owner-spouse for good behavior.
Table 5: High-Leverage/Good-Investment/20-Year Marriage227
= $100,000;
= $80,000; 30-year loan @ 5%
NonOwnerNAI; $429.46 payment ($214.73 per spouse);
=
Owner
Spouse
$40,488.70 ($39,511.30 principal paid); end mode.
Spouse
= $732,807.36 (10.00% NAI return); equity =
$692,318.66.
ROI
ROI
California Moore/New Mexico/Florida
144,770.86 547,547.80
9.074%
13.433%
Kentucky/Delaware/Virginia/Georgia/Missouri/ 229,825.35 462,293.31
Maryland/North Carolina
12.582%
12.429%
Nevada/ Maine/Minnesota
272,878.59 419,440.07
13.830%
11.847%
Florida Kaaa
252,634.24 439,684.42
13.273%
12.130%
Texas/Louisiana/Idaho
19,755.65
672,563.01
-11.834%
14.638%
Pennsylvania/Colorado
316,403.68 375,914.98
14.887%
11.186%
Illinois Transmutation
346,159.33 346,159.33
15.521%
10.684%
Economic Reimbursement Formula
163,059.27 529,259.39
10.00%
13.232%
B. Example 8: Low Leverage
Consider the following facts and the three plausible scenarios used above:
Prior to marriage, A owns a house with a $100,000 date-ofmarriage fair market value and owes a $20,000 5% secured loan
with 30 years of $107.36228 monthly payments remaining. A and
B reside in the house and marital/community assets service the

227. See supra note 210 for definitions; see supra Table 1 for formulas.
228. The $107.36 amortization payment =

where n = the number of periods, i = the

nominal annual interest rate, and PV = the present value (the amount borrowed). In the example, n = 360,
i = 5%, and PV = $20,000. A Hewlett-Packard 10Bii calculator also computes the payment amount as
$107.36.
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loan. Twenty years later, they divorce. The loan has $10,122.45
principal remaining.229
a. Scenario Four: Low-Leverage/Bad-Investment
With slow appreciation of 3.25% – relative to the 5% loan rate – the house
would be worth $191,385.85230 in twenty years, with equity of $181,261.62.231 The
property’s investment return would be 3.011%232 NAI. The low return results from
the relatively high cost of capital, 5%, as compared to the lower property appreciation
of 3.25%. The return exceeds that in the High-Leverage Example because so much
less of the investment is leveraged.
Readers should pay close attention to non-owner-spouse negative returns,
as well as to any owner-spouse returns exceeding the 3.25% house appreciation.
Non-owner returns materially lower than 3.25% arguably shortchange the spouse.
Owner-spouse returns exceeding 3.25% reward a bad investment.
Table 6: Low-Leverage/Bad-Investment/20-Year Marriage233
= $100,000;
= $20,000; 30-year loan @ 5%
NonOwnerNAI; $107.36 payment ($53.68 per spouse);
=
Owner
Spouse
$10,124.23 ($9,875.77 principal paid); end mode.
Spouse
= $191,385.85 (3.25% NAI return); equity =
$181,261.62.
ROI
ROI
California Moore/New Mexico/Florida
9,450.41
171,811.21
-3.288%
3.268%
Kentucky/Delaware/Virginia/Georgia/Missouri/M 9,958.74
171,302.88
aryland/North Carolina
-2.705%
3.252%
Nevada
14,076.47 167,185.15
0.877%
3.124%
Maine/Minnesota
56,309.99 94,587.16
0.877%
2.114%

229. A HP 10Bii calculator produces a $10,124.23 principal amount after 20 years. To reproduce this
number, set P/YR as 12, N (the number of payments) as 240, mode as END, PV as 20,000, I/YR as 5, PMT
as -107.36, and solve for FV.
230. The $191,385.85 future value =

1

, where PV = the present value ($100,000), i = the

nominal rate divided by 12 (3.25 /12 = .2708333) and n = the number of compounding periods (20 years
times 12 months per year = 240). A HP 10Bii calculator produces a $191,385.85 future value after 20
years. To reproduce this number, set P/YR as 12, N as 240, mode as END, PV as 100,000, I/YR as 3.25,
PMT as 0, and solve for FV.
231. $191,385.85 fair market value minus $10,124.23 principal remaining after 20 years.
232. The return on investment is the nominal annual rate (compounded monthly to correspond with
the monthly payments) of growth in the down-payment plus monthly payments. Using an HP 10Bii
calculator, set PV as 80,000 (to reflect the down-payment), PMT as 107.36 (to reflect the investment of
the monthly loan payment), N as 240 (to reflect the twenty years), mode as END (to reflect payments
made at the end of each period), and FV as -181,263.40 (the equity in twenty years) stated as a negative
number to represent the cash flow directionally the opposite of the investment, and solve for the NAI or
I/YR (nominal interest per year). The result is 3.01082%. The effective rate is 3.05272%.
233. See supra note 210 for definitions.
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Florida Kaaa
Texas/Louisiana/Idaho
Pennsylvania/Colorado
Illinois Transmutation
Economic Reimbursement Formula

9,014.36
-3.824%
4,937.89
-11.837%
45,692.93
10.873%
90,630.81
15.844%
18,112.96
3.250%

172,247.26
3.281%
176,323.73
3.404%
135,568.69
2.017%
90,630.81
-0.132%
163,148.66
2.996%

b. Scenario Five: Low-Leverage/Neutral-House-Appreciation
With “neutral” appreciation of 5% – equal to the 5% loan rate – the house
would be worth $271,264.03 in twenty years,234 with equity of $261,139.80.235 The
property’s return on investment would be 5%236 NAI.
Once again, readers should pay close attention to any non-owner-spouse
negative returns, as well as any returns that materially diverge from the 5% neutral
return.
Table 7: Low-Leverage/Neutral-Investment/20-Year Marriage237
= $100,000;
= $20,000; 30-year loan @ 5%
NonOwnerNAI; $107.36 payment ($53.68 per spouse);
=
Owner
Spouse
$10,124.23 ($9,875.77 principal paid); end mode.
Spouse
= $271,264.03 (5.00% NAI return); equity =
$261,139.80.
ROI
ROI
California Moore/New Mexico/Florida
13,394.71
247,745.09
0.389%
5.186%
Kentucky/Delaware/Virginia/Georgia/Missouri/ 14,347.34
246,792.46
Maryland/North Carolina
1.063%
5.166%
Nevada/ Maine/Minnesota
22,064.31
239,075.49
5.000%
5.000%
Florida Kaaa
17,002.17
244,137.63
2.670%
5.109%
Texas/Louisiana/Idaho
4,937.89
256,201.91
234. The $271,264.03 future value =

1

, where PV = the present value ($100,000), i = the

nominal rate divided by 12 (5/12 = .41666667) and n = the number of compounding periods (20 years
times 12 months). Using an HP10Bii calculator and inputting a 100,000 present value, a zero payment,
240 periods, and a 5% nominal interest rate produces a $271,264.03 future value.
235. $271,264.03 fair market value minus the $10,124.23 principal remaining after 20 years.
236. Using an HP 10Bii calculator, and inputting an 80,000 present value (the down-payment), a
107.36 payment, 240 periods, a -261,139.80 future value ($271,264.03 minus $10,124.23, the equity in
twenty years stated as a negative number to represent the cash flow), solving for the interest rate produces
a 5.000% NAI. The effective rate would be 5.116%.
237. See supra note 210 for definitions; see supra Table 1 for formulas.
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-11.837%
85,632.02
15.447%
130,569.90
18.353%
22,064.29
5.00%

5.361%
175,507.78
3.380%
130,569.90
1.818%
239,075.51
5.00%

c. Scenario Six: Low Leverage, Good Investment
With “high” appreciation of 10% – twice the 5% loan rate – the house would
be worth $732,807.36 in twenty years,238 with equity of $722,683.13.239 The
property’s return on investment would be 10.416%.240
Readers should pay attention to any non-owner-spouse negative returns, as
well as returns which materially diverge from the 10% house appreciation. Formulas
that produce a non-owner return with-in 125 basis points of the 10% house
appreciation appear in grey. Readers should also compare the non-owner return to
that of the owner: in many states, the scenario oddly produces a higher non-owner
return. Logically, the owner-spouse – who made a comparatively good investment –
should receive a higher return: he/she not only accepted the risk of loss, but he/she
also produced a strong return. Formulas that result in a higher non-owner return
arguably punish the owner-spouse for good behavior.
Table 8: Low-Leverage/Good-Investment/20-Year Marriage241
= $100,000;
= $20,000; 30-year loan @ 5%
NonOwnerNAI; $107.36 payment ($53.68 per spouse);
=
Owner
Spouse
$10,124.23 ($9,875.77 principal paid); end mode.
Spouse
= $732,807.36 (10.00% NAI return); equity =
$722,683.13.
ROI
ROI
California Moore/New Mexico/Florida
36,185.18 686,497.95
9.073%
10.467%
Kentucky/Delaware/Virginia/Georgia/Missouri/
39,705.10 682,978.03
Maryland/North Carolina
9.797%
10.441%
Nevada/ Maine/Minnesota
68,218.62 654,464.51
13.830%
10.221%

238. The $732,807.36 future value =

1

, where PV = the present value ($100,000), i = the

nominal rate divided by 12 (10/12 = .41666667) and n = the number of compounding periods (20 years
times 12 months). Using an HP10Bii calculator and inputting a 100,000 present value, a zero payment,
240 periods, a 10% NAI produces a 732,807.36 future value.
239. $732,807.36 fair market value minus the $10,124.23 principal remaining after 20 years.
240. Using an HP 10Bii calculator, and inputting an 80,000 present value (the down-payment), a
107.36 payment, 240 periods, a -722,683.13 future value ($732,807.36 minus $10,124.23, the equity in
twenty years stated as a negative number to represent the cash flow), solving for the interest rate produces
a 10.416% NAI. The effective rate would be 10.928%.
241. See supra note 210 for definitions; see supra Table 1 for formulas.
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Florida Kaaa
Texas/Louisiana/Idaho
Pennsylvania/Colorado
Illinois Transmutation
Economic Reimbursement Formula

63,156.49
13.273%
4,937.89
-11.837%
316,403.68
24.165%
361,341.57
25.012%
40,762.92
10.00%

659,526.64
10.261%
717,745.24
10.697%
406,279.45
7.757%
361,341.56
7.150%
681,920.21
10.433%

C. Example 9: Extremely-High-Leverage
Consider the following facts and the three plausible scenarios used above:
Prior to marriage, A owns a house with a $100,000 date-ofmarriage fair market value and owes a $95,000 5% secured loan,
with 30 years of $509.98242 monthly payments remaining. A and
B reside in the house and marital/community assets service the
loan. Twenty years later, they divorce. The loan has $48,081.88
principal remaining.243
a. Scenario Seven: Extremely-High-Leverage/Bad-Investment
With slow appreciation of 3.25% – relative to the 5% loan rate – the house
would be worth $191,385.85244 in twenty years, with equity of $143,303.97.245 The
property’s investment return would be -3.049%.246 The negative return results from

242. The $509.98 amortization payment =

where n = the number of periods, i = the

nominal annual interest rate, and PV = the present value (the amount borrowed). In the example, n = 360,
i = 5%, and PV = $95,000. A Hewlett-Packard 10Bii calculator also computes the payment amount as
$509.98.
243. A HP 10Bii calculator produces a $48,081.88 principal amount after 20 years. To reproduce this
number, set P/YR as 12, N (the number of payments) as 240, mode as END, PV as 95,000, I/YR as 5, PMT
as -509.98, and solve for FV.
244. The $191,385.85 future value =

1

, where PV = the present value ($100,000), i = the

nominal rate divided by 12 (3.25 /12 = .2708333) and n = the number of compounding periods (20 years
times 12 months per year = 240). A HP 10Bii calculator produces a future value of $191,385.85 after 20
years. To reproduce this number, set P/YR as 12, N as 240, mode as END, PV as 100,000, I/YR as 3.25,
PMT as 0, and solve for FV.
245. $191,385.85 fair market value minus the $48,081.88 loan principal remaining after 20 years.
246. The return on investment is the nominal annual rate (compounded monthly to correspond with
monthly payments) of growth in the down-payment plus monthly payments. Using an HP 10Bii calculator,
set PV as 95,000 (to reflect the down-payment), PMT as 509.98 (to reflect investment of the monthly loan
payment), N as 240 (to reflect twenty years), mode as END (to reflect payments being made at the end of
each period), and FV as -143,303.97 (the equity in twenty years) stated as a negative number to represent
the cash flow directionally the opposite of the investment, and solve for I/YR (nominal interest per year).
The result is -3.04917%. The effective rate is -3.00691%.
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the relatively high cost of capital, 5%, as compared to the lower 3.25% property
appreciation, as well as the high leverage. The return underperforms that of the HighLeverage Example because so much more of the investment is leveraged.
Readers should pay close attention to non-owner-spouse negative returns,
as well as to any owner-spouse return exceeding the 3.25% house appreciation. Nonowner returns materially lower than 3.25% arguably shortchange the spouse. Ownerspouse returns exceeding 3.25% reward a bad investment.
Table 9: Extremely-High-Leverage/Bad-Investment/20-Year Marriage247
= $100,000;
= $95,000; 30-year loan @ 5%
NonOwnerNAI; $509.98 payment ($254.99 per spouse);
Owner
Spouse
= $48,081.88 ($46,918.12 principal paid); end
Spouse
mode.
= $191,385.85 (3.25% NAI return); equity =
$143,303.97.
ROI
ROI
California Moore/New Mexico/Florida
44,898.03
98,405.94
-3.286%
3.491%
Kentucky/Delaware/Virginia/Georgia/Missouri/
64,751.51
78,552.46
Maryland/North Carolina
0.562%
1.555%
Nevada/ Maine/Minnesota
66,867.34
76,436.63
0.877%
1.312%
Florida Kaaa
42,826.40 100,477.57
-3.822%
3.665%
Texas/Louisiana/Idaho
23,459.06 119,844.91
-11.834%
5.160%
Pennsylvania/Colorado
45,692.93
97,611.04
-3.090%
3.424%
Illinois Transmutation
71,651.99
71,651.98
1.545%
0.730%
Economic Reimbursement Formula
86,039.92
57,264.05
3.250%
-1.389%
b. Scenario Eight: Extremely-High-Leverage/Neutral-House-Appreciation
With “neutral” appreciation of 5% – equal to the 5% loan rate – the house
would be worth $271,264.03 in twenty years,248 with $223,182.15 equity.249 The
property’s investment return would be 5%.250

247. See supra note 210 for definitions; see supra Table 1 for formulas.
248. The $271,264.03 future value =

1

, where PV = the present value ($100,000), i = the

nominal rate divided by 12 (5/12 = .41666667) and n = the number of compounding periods (20 years
times 12 months). Using an HP10Bii calculator and inputting a 100,000 present value, a zero payment,
240 periods, a 5% NAI produces a 271,264.03 future value.
249. $271,264.03 fair market value minus the $48,081.88 principal remaining after 20 years.
250. Using an HP 10Bii calculator, and inputting a 5,000 present value (the down-payment), a 509.98
payment, 240 periods, a -223,182.15 future value ($271,264.03 minus $48,081.88, the equity in twenty
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Readers should pay attention to any non-owner-spouse negative returns, as
well as returns materially diverge from 5% house appreciation and cost of capital.
Formulas that produce a non-owner return with-in 125 basis points of the 5% house
appreciation appear in grey.
Table 10: Extremely-High-Leverage/Neutral-Investment/20-Year
Marriage251
= $100,000;
= $95,000; 30-year loan @ 5%
NonOwnerNAI; $509.98 payment ($254.99 per spouse);
Owner
Spouse
= $48,081.88 ($46,918.12 principal paid); end
Spouse
mode.
= $271,264.03 (5% NAI return); equity =
$223,182.15.
ROI
ROI
California Moore/New Mexico/Florida
63,635.99
159,546.16
0.390%
7.316%
Kentucky/Delaware/Virginia/Georgia/Missouri/ 100,844.24 122,337.91
Maryland/North Carolina
4.664%
5.263%
Nevada/ Maine/Minnesota
104,809.47 118,372.68
5.000%
5.000%
Florida Kaaa
80,768.62
142,413.53
2.671%
6.450%
Texas/Louisiana/Idaho
23,459.06
199,723.09
-11.835%
8.977%
Pennsylvania/Colorado
85,632.02
137,550.13
3.207%
6.182%
Illinois Transmutation
111,591.08 111,591.07
5.539%
4.525%
Economic Reimbursement Formula
104,809.47 118,372.68
5.000%
5.000%
c. Scenario Nine: Extremely-High-Leverage/Good-Investment
With “high” appreciation of 10% – twice the 5% loan rate – the house would
be worth $732,807.36 in twenty years,252 with $684,725.48 equity.253 The property’s
investment return would be 13.217%.254

years stated as a negative number to represent the cash flow), solving for the interest rate produces a
4.999% NAI. The effective rate is 5.116%.
251. See supra note 210 for definitions.
252. The $732,807.36 future value =

1

, where PV = the present value ($100,000), i = the

nominal rate divided by 12 (10/12 = .41666667) and n = the number of compounding periods (20 years
times 12 months). Using an HP10Bii calculator and inputting a 100,000 present value, a zero payment,
240 periods, a 10% NAI produces a $732,807.36 future value.
253. $732,807.36 fair market value minus the $48,081.88 principal remaining after 20 years.
254. Using an HP 10Bii calculator, and inputting a 5,000 present value (the down-payment), a 509.98
payment, 240 periods, a -684,725.48 future value ($732,807.36 minus $48,081.88, the equity in twenty
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Readers should pay attention to non-owner-spouse negative returns, as well
as returns that materially diverge from the 10% house appreciation. Formulas that
produce a non-owner return with-in 125 basis points of the 10% house appreciation
appear in grey. Readers should also compare the non-owner return to that of the
owner: in many states, the scenario oddly produces a higher non-owner return.
Logically, the owner-spouse – who made a comparatively good investment – should
receive a higher return: he not only accepted the risk of loss, but he/she also produced
a strong return. Formulas resulting in a higher non-owner return arguably punish the
owner-spouse for good behavior.
Table 11: Extremely-High-Leverage/Good-Investment/20-Year Marriage255
= $100,000;
= $95,000; 30-year loan @ 5%
NonOwnerNAI; $509.98 payment ($254.99 per spouse);
Owner
Spouse
= $48,081.88 ($46,918.12 principal paid); end
Spouse
mode.
= $732,807.36 (10% NAI return); equity =
$684,725.48.
ROI
ROI
California Moore/New Mexico/Florida
171,909.72 512,815.76
9.074%
15.426%
Kentucky/Delaware/Virginia/Georgia/Missouri/ 309,391.33 375,334.15
Maryland/North Carolina
13.496%
13.368%
Nevada/ Maine/Minnesota
324,042.56 360,682.92
13.830%
13.100%
Florida Kaaa
Texas/Louisiana/Idaho
Pennsylvania/Colorado
Illinois Transmutation
Economic Reimbursement Formula

300,401.62
13.283%
23,459.06
-11.835%
316,403.68
13.658%
342,262.74
14.223%
193,631.50
10.000%

332,405.74
12.549%
661,266.42
17.062%
368,321.80
13.241%
342,262.74
12.746%
491,093.98
15.144%

III. OBSERVATIONS
This Part has five divisions:
 Two charts with explanations comparing the eight formulas and
focusing on which work well and when they do so.
 A state-by-state summary – grouped by formula – of the example
results.

years stated as a negative number to represent the cash flow), solving for the interest rate produces a
13.217% NAI. The effective rate is 14.048%.
255. See supra note 214 for definitions; see supra Table 1 for formulas.
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An additional illustration demonstrating how all existing formulas
inadequately deal with timing issues.
A return to the Prelude Example demonstrating manipulation
opportunities.
A final extreme illustration demonstrating how all existing
formulas deal poorly with a posited example.

A. Summary Charts and General Observations
Chart 1 lists the investment return the non-owner-spouse would receive
under each of the seven formulas and nine examples. The focus is on the non-ownerspouse because that is the point of all the various formulas: to ensure the non-owner
receive a reasonable return on his/her share of the marital/community assets
contributed. In all cases, one the formula determines that reasonable portion, the
remainder belongs to the owner-spouse.
The last line of Chart 1 lists the return using the proposed Economic
Formula. It always equals the appreciation in the marital home securing the separate
debt. The Chart then highlights two types of returns. First, in red are all instances of
a non-owner receiving a negative return. These seem particular harsh in that such
cases involve the spouse actually losing money in real economic terms, rather than
sharing in the property appreciation that occurs in all examples. Second, in grey
boxes, are instances of a non-owner receiving a return within 300 basis points of the
house appreciation. That is an arguably arbitrary measure – but a measure
nevertheless – of how close some of the formulas came to the actual asset
appreciation. Three hundred basis points is a material, but not huge deviation. This
Chart applies it as the standard in all cases; hence, it highlights larger percentage
deviations in low appreciation (bad-investment) examples as compared to high
appreciation (good-investment) examples. Despite that arguable mis-weight of the
measure, it is nevertheless consistent in the absolute magnitude of the acceptable
deviation.
Significantly, twenty-four of sixty-three scenarios fit within this generous
300 basis-point margin of deviation. The Nevada formula performs best, with six of
nine results being within that measure of an acceptable result. But, eighteen of sixtythree scenarios (not highlighted) result in the non-owner being shortchanged by a
substantial amount when compared to the house appreciation. Further, nineteen of
sixty-three scenarios resulting the in the non-owner being so shortchanged she
actually receives a negative return on her share of the marital/community assets used.
Chart 1256

Cal/FL

HLB

HLN

HLG

LLB

LLN

LLG

EHLB

EHLN

EHLG

-3.286

0.390

9.074

-3.288

0.389

9.703

-3.286

0.390

9.074

256. HLB (High-Leverage/Bad-Investment), HLN (High-Leverage/Neutral-Investment), HLG (HighLeverage/Good-Investment), LLB (Low-Leverage/Bad-Investment), LLN (Low-Leverage/NeutralInvestment), LLG (Low-Leverage/Good-Investment), EHLB (Extremely-High-Leverage/BadInvestment), EHLN (Extremely-High-Leverage/Neutral-Investment), and EHLG (Extremely-HighLeverage/Good-Investment).
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-0.286

3.753

12.582

-2.705

1.063

9.797

0.562

4.664

13.496

0.877

5.000

13.830

0.877

5.000

13.830

0.877

5.000

13.830

-3.822

2.671

13.273

-3.824

2.670

13.273

-3.822

2.671

13.283

11.834

11.834

11.834

11.837

11.837

11.837

11.834

11.835

11.835

-1.233

4.736

14.877

10.873

15.447

24.165

-3.090

3.207

13.658

3.616

7.254

15.521

15.844

18.353

25.012

1.545

5.539

14.223

3.250

5.000

10.000

3.250

5.000

10.000

3.250

5.000

10.000

Chart 2 also lists the investment return the non-owner-spouse would receive
under each of the formulas and examples. It, too, lists negative returns in red. But
this chart highlights, in gray, acceptable deviations with a different standard than
used above. Here, the chart defines an acceptable deviation as one within 30% of the
house appreciation. It thus weighs the deviation differently than Chart 1. For
example, a 30% deviation from a 3.250% appreciation is 975 basis points, a 30%
deviation from a 5% appreciation is 150 basis points, and a 30% deviation from a
10% appreciation is 300 basis points. Because this chart weighs the acceptable
deviation as a consistent function of the asset appreciation, it finds fewer results in
the acceptable range.
Significantly only sixteen of sixty-three scenarios fit within this less
generous margin of acceptable deviation. Of those, four are on the high-side: the
non-owner receives a return greater than the asset appreciation. The Kentucky
formula performs best, with four of nine scenarios being with the acceptable range.
Chart 2
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-1.233
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15.447
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25.012
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But nineteen of sixty-three scenarios produce negative returns for the nonowner-spouse. Even eliminating the Texas/Louisiana formula, which is mere
reimbursement without interest, all the others at least purport to share the
appreciation equitably with the non-owner; yet, ten of fifty-four produce negative
returns. Another nine are at least 50% below the house return. Twenty exceed the
house return, which results in shortchanging the owner-spouse.
B. A State-by-State Summary
a. California
The California Moore Supreme Court quoted approvingly from a lower
court:
the community is entitled to a minimum interest in the property
represented by the ratio of the community investment to the total
separate and community investment in the property. In the event
the fair market value has increased disproportionately to the
increase in equity the wife is entitled to participate in that
increment in a similar proportion.257
But, does the Moore formula accomplish that goal: the non-owner
participating proportionately to the owner in appreciation that differs from the equity
change? No, and the results are not even close in most scenarios. In the HLB scenario
(Table 1 with a 20-year marriage) the property equity increased by 11.346%, while
the house appreciated at 3.25%. The non-owner, however, received a -3.286% return
and the owner a 3.399% return. Even using the more relevant ROI for the property
of 1.708%, the non-owner appears seriously shortchanged. Shortening the marriage
to 10 years (Table 2) produced an almost shocking non-owner return of negative
22.339% compared to the 4.321% owner-return. Lengthening the marriage to 30
years (Table 3) produced a more reasonable 2.006% non-owner return, compared to
a 2.550% for the owner.
Similar deviations occur in the HLN scenario (Table 4). The property equity
increased by 12.269% NAI, while the house appreciated at 5.00%. The non-owner,
however, received a paltry 0.390% return and the owner a generous 6.454% return.
In the LLN scenario (Table 7), the deviation was less severe, but still material:
property equity increased by 5.930%, while the house appreciated at 5%. The nonowner, however, again received a paltry 0.389% and the owner 5.186%.
In contrast, the HLG scenario (Table 5) was within a reasonable margin, as
were the EHLG (Table 11) and LLG (Table 8) scenarios. The property equity
increased by 17.853% (HLG), 24.852% (EHLG), and 18.071% (LLG), while the
house appreciated at 10.00% in each instance. The non-owner, however, consistently
received a reasonable 9.074% return in each scenario, regardless of leverage. The
owner received a return which varied by leverage: a deserved 13.433% return (HLG),
15.426% (EHLG), and 10.467% (LLG).
Because the Californian non-owner formula is not a function of leverage,
the non-owner is thus seriously shortchanged with a negative return in the bad
257. Moore v. Moore, 618 P.2d 208, 210 (1980) (emphasis added).
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investment scenarios while the owner is rewarded for his bad investment with a
generous return. Similarly, in the neutral scenarios, the non-owner is again
shortchanged. But, in the good-investment scenarios, the California formula works
acceptably well: it is then (and only then) consistent with an objective economic
return and it is also consistent with the stated goal of the California Supreme Court.
Because the formula focuses only on principal payments, it is subject to
manipulation, as demonstrated below in owner-spouses have a bizarre incentive to
pay less principal with marital/community assets and non-owners will seek to have
more paid.258
b. Florida
Florida uses the same formula as does California; hence, the same
observations apply: non-owner spouses are shortchanged in all bad investment or
neutral investment scenarios. Only in good-investment cases – those in which the
house appreciates significantly more than the mortgage loan interest rate – does the
Florida formula produce an economically reasonable result. Florida, however,
deserves special mention because of the clear goals set by the Legislature and the
Florida Bar Family Law Section. Legislative history states:
[T]he proposed coverture fraction is designed to measure the
actual martial [sic] contributions of each party in paying down the
mortgage during the marriage when measuring passive
appreciation. The Section believes the formula is more fair and
equitable to the owner spouse. While the nonowner spouse may
receive much less under the coverture formula than the Kaaa
formula, the Section notes that the coverture formula only applies
to passive appreciation (market forces and inflation), and that the
nonowner spouse is still entitled to a 50 percent share of active
appreciation. 259
The Family Law Section believed the old Kaaa formula was unfair to the
owner-spouse. Plus, the drafters noted the new formula may reduce what the nonowner received under Kaaa. Because that was the stated goal, testing it with
examples seems appropriate. The following discussion tests it in three ways: with
the examples provided earlier, with a specific application to the Kaaa facts, and with
an example offered by the Florida Bar Family Law Section. Each demonstrates flaws
in the Florida statute; indeed, using the Family Law Section example further
illustrates serious flaws not only in the Florida/California formula, but also in the
widely-used Kentucky formula.
i. Observations from Prior Examples and Scenarios
In all “bad-investment” scenarios, the new Florida formula shortchanges
the non-owner-spouse, though not quite as badly as under the old Kaaa rule. In each
of the three “bad investment” examples – low leverage, high leverage and extremely
high leverage –– the non-owner-spouse received a negative return ranging from -

258. See infra Tables 14 and 15.
259. 2012 BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 32, at 7.
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3.286% NAI to -3.288%, while the owner-spouse received a positive return ranging
from 3.286% to 3.491%. But the house appreciated at 3.25%, which means the
Florida formula rewards the bad investment made by the owner-spouse.
In comparison, the old Kaaa formula diverged slightly more from the house
appreciation of 3.25%. In all “bad-investment” scenarios, it produced a negative
return for the non-owner-spouse ranging from -3.822% to -3.824%. In contrast, it
consistently rewarded the owner-spouse with a high return (compared to the house
appreciation) ranging from 3.281% to 3.665%. Thus the new Florida statutory
formula improves slightly on the Kaaa formula whenever the owner-spouse makes
a bad investment; however, the improvement is insufficient, as it continues to
shortchange the non-owner by a substantial amount, albeit less than under Kaaa. In
these scenarios, it returns less to the owner-spouse, which is contrary to the general
statement that “the [new] formula is more fair and equitable to the owner-spouse.”260
In all neutral-investment scenarios – in which the house appreciates at the
same rate as the mortgage loan charges – the new statute shortchanges the non-owner
with a significantly smaller return, and a marginally higher return to the owner. In
the examples, the house appreciated by 5%, but the non-owner-spouse received a
paltry return ranging from 0.389 to 0.390%. In contrast, the old Kaaa formula
provides the non-owner with a reasonable return ranging from 2.670% to 2.671%.
Thus the new formula consistently reduces the non-owner return by approximately
200 basis points.
In contrast, in all neutral investment scenarios, the new Florida formula
continues to provide the owner-spouse with a higher return than the house
appreciation or the cost of the loan – both 5% NAI. The owner returns range from
5.186% to 7.316%. Significantly, the higher the leverage, the higher the owner
return. Arguably these returns, compared to the 5% cost of capital and 5% asset
appreciation, are reasonable because the owner accepts the risk of loss and thus is
arguably entitled to some extra compensation. But, the extra compensation, when
observed from the point of view of the non-owner, seems excessive because the
owner return is so much less than the neutral 5%. Similarly, the old Kaaa formula
provided the owner-spouse, in neutral scenarios, a return ranging from 5.109% to
6.450%. That is an insignificant change, except that it is slightly higher under the
new formula, consistent with the stated goal of being “more fair” to the ownerspouse.
In all “good-investment” scenarios, the new Florida formula improves on
the Kaaa formula. Under Kaaa, the non-owner-spouse received a return ranging
from 13.273% to 13.283% whenever the house appreciated at 10% but the cost of
capital was only 5%. Those scenarios arguably over-compensated the non-owner.
The new formula provides a return more consistent with the house appreciation, with
returns ranging from 9.073% to 9.074%. This is especially important considering the
owner accepted the risk of loss and made a good investment.
In contrast, under Kaaa, in good-investment scenarios, the owner received
a return ranging from 10.261% to 12.545%. The higher the leverage, the higher the
owner-spouse return. The new formula increases the owner-spouse return by a small
amount in each scenario, ranging from 10.467% to 15.426%.
260. 2012 BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 32, at 7.
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Thus, the new formula works well in good-investment situations.
Significantly, the posited scenarios were very good investments, with the house
appreciation being twice the cost of capital. But in all other cases, the new formula
shortchanges the non-owner-spouse. Significantly, the new formula – as compared
to Kaaa – improves the owner-spouse return (the stated goal) only in those verygood-investment scenarios.
ii. Applying the new formula to the Kaaa facts
Significantly, the Florida Legislative history focused on the perceived flaws
of Kaaa. It stated:
The Florida Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to
do the math, so the ultimate result is unknown. But applying the
fraction above to the known numbers in the Kaaa case, the result
appears to be that Mrs. Kaaa would have been entitled to $83,102
for passive appreciation[.] . . .
Adding together Mrs. Kaaa’s share of the passive appreciation
($83,102) to her share of the active appreciation based on the pay
down of the mortgage and the carport renovation ($18,339.50),
Mrs. Kaaa’s share of the home value appreciation may have been
around $101,441.50. This combined total amount of appreciation
is approximately 45 percent of the home’s fair market value.261
Unfortunately, the computations appearing in the Senate Staff analysis are
flawed in several ways, both significant and small.
A less significant mathematical flaw – but an important philosophical one
– involved the number the Senate staff used as the date-of-marriage debt amount.
That number is critical both to the Kaaa formula and also to the new statutory
formula; hence, using the correct number is important. Unfortunately, the Florida
Court did not state the number. Granted, the trial court’s fact findings were likely
insufficient; however, the Supreme Court’s failure to point out the lack of the critical
number is disappointing. The Court noted:
Katherine and Joseph Kaaa married in 1980. For the next twentyseven years, they resided in a home in Riverview, Florida, that
Joseph Kaaa purchased about six months before the Kaaas’
marriage. Joseph Kaaa purchased the home for $36,500 and made
a $2000 down payment.262

261. 2012 BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 32, at 6.
262. Kaaa v. Kaaa, 58 So. 3d 867, 869 (Fla. 2010). The Court described the price as $36,500 and the
down-payment as $2000, which suggests $34,500 initial financing; however, the initial liability was
actually $35,150. Initial Brief of Appellant at 3, Kaaa v. Kaaa 58 So. 3d 867 (2010) (No. SC09-967);
Mortg. of Joseph P. L. Kaaa, (Oct. 8, 1979) (recorded in Hillsborough Cty., Fla., OFF. REC. 3575 PG
1948). The monthly payments were $321.62 and the original principal amount was $35,150. Mortg. of
Joseph P. L. Kaaa, (Oct. 8, 1979) (recorded in Hillsborough Cty., Fla., OFF. REC. 3575 PG 1948).
Notably, neither the Florida Supreme Court nor the Florida Appellate Court stated these important facts.
The initial debt was for 30 years at 10.5% NAI. Id. Neither the Court nor the briefs state the date-ofmarriage principal amount due. The parties married in March, 1980. Respondent’s Answer Brief at 2,
Kaaa v. Kaaa 58 So. 3d 867 (2010) (No. SC09-967). They divorced on December 18, 2007. Kaaa v. Kaaa,
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Although that suggests an initial debt of $34,500, the actual date-ofmarriage amount was more likely $35,400.263 While the difference is not huge, it
involves a critical fact which the Court failed to provide. Further, the legislative staff
– in arguing Ms. Kaaa received too much – failed to discern the correct or even
approximate number.
Another important fact missing from both the Supreme Court and staff
analysis involves the “re-financing” of the original loan. The Supreme Court stated:
Although the home was refinanced multiple times during the
marriage, Katherine Kaaa was never granted an interest in the
property.264
But the Court’s statement is inaccurate. Mr. Kaaa borrowed additional
monies using the house as collateral during the marriage, but nothing shows either
he alone or with Ms. Kaaa “re-financed” the original loan. Not knowing what was
borrowed, by whom, when, at what interest rate, and when it was paid makes
analyzing the case very difficult. That neither the Court nor the legislative staff
appeared to have inquired is disturbing, especially considering the information is a
public record. New loans during the marriage would have been marital liabilities,
unless they were truly refinancing in exchange for the prior loan.265 Because the
original loan apparently continued, the following calculations ignore the new loans
which presumably were fully paid during the marriage.266
But, the amount due on the loan is another critical number neither the Court,
nor the parties’ briefs adequately explain. They stipulated the amount was
$12,871.46, which was $22,279 lower than the initial loan. 267 But they do not explain
what the number $12,871.46 represented. Although clearly it must have been the
“pay-off” amount on the date of the dissolution filing, that does not necessarily mean
it was part of the original principal owed. Indeed, had all payments been made timely
– on the first of each month – that amount would have been the amortized principal
owed in August, 2005. However, the parties did not file for dissolution until
sometime in 2007, about two years later. Assuming the other loans were paid in full
by their respective due dates, the only268 explanation for the $12,871.46 amount
would be that Mr. Kaaa made many payments after the first of each month. This is
critical because interest would have accrued daily at 0.029167%. Initially, a payment
on the second of the month would have accrued an additional $10.20 of interest,
which would be capitalized as principal. Two decades later, a one-day delay would
have only added about $4.37. Nothing in the record says when each payment was
9 So. 3d 756, 757 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). The exact date of the marriage is not evident in the record.
The principal due in mid-March was approximately $35,400, including accrued interest, assuming Mr.
Kaaa made the prior payments timely. Without interest, the date-of-marriage principal due was
approximately $35,070.
263. Kaaa, 9 So. 3d at 757.
264. Kaaa, 58 So. 3d at 869.
265. FLA. STAT. ANN. §61.075 (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 26th Legis., 2019).
266. Each of the loans had a term that started during the marriage and ended prior to the dissolution.
267. Kaaa, 58 So. 3d at 869.
268. The remaining amount due had to be capitalized interest or late payment penalties. Nothing else
makes sense.
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made; however, using the stated 27 years as the period of the marriage, the amount
owed at the date of the dissolution filing should have been merely $1,202.78. The
extra $11,668.68 must have been accrued and capitalized interest.
Having that amount of accrued capitalized interest is not shocking – it likely
resulted from frequent payments a day or two after the first of the month, but still
timely. Yet, it amounts to approximately 90% of the remaining debt. Significantly,
both the Kaaa formula and the statutory formula that replaced it profess to ignore
interest payments. But both fail to account for the reality that interest accrues over
time and as it accrues, it becomes a debt. It is just as much principal as the original
amount borrowed.
Despite those factual errors and omissions, one can approximate what Ms.
Kaaa should have received on remand. She should have received $96,455.12,269
which would have been 42.87% of the house value and 45.47% of the equity. The
staff mistakenly argued she would have received $101,441.50,270 which would be
45.09% of the house value and 47.82% of the equity. Applying the new statute, Ms.
Kaaa would have received $72,193.29,271 or 32.09% of the house value and 34.03%
of the equity. Interestingly, the legislative staff computation error exceeds 20% of
the reduction in the amount that would be awarded to her under the statute as opposed
to under Kaaa. The house appreciated at 6.509% and the cost of capital was 10.5%
– a bad-investment example.
iii. Florida Family Law Section Examples
In 2013, Florida bar members posited two examples to illustrate absurd
results under the then-used Kaaa formula. They argued their proposed formula –
adopted in 2018 – would resolve the absurdity. From the point of view presented,
indeed, it does resolve that particular problem, but deeper analysis shows the
examples illustrate absurd results from the new Florida formula (the same as
California Moore). The 2013 article stated:
[A]ssume a parcel of nonmarital real property has a mortgage of
$90,000 and a fair market value of $100,000 at the time of the
marriage, which passively appreciates during a four-year marriage
to $300,000. Assume also that the mortgage is also paid down
269. Although the Court found a loan reduction of $22,279, the amount was likely $22,528.54. That
combined with $14,400 of carport enhancement equals $36,928.54 active enhancement, half of which is
$18,464.27.

Applying
,

12,871.46

the

Kaaa

“passive

225,000 – 36,500

,

appreciation”

formula

,

14,400 , 168,853.15 – 12,871.46 = 155,981.69. Half the

passive appreciation was $77,990.85. With the $18,464.27 share of active appreciation, she should have
received $96,455.12.
270. 2012 BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 32, at 5. The committee staff, however, included the carport
enhancement as part of the house value, thus including it twice: once as active appreciation and once as
passive. The error, using the staff’s mistaken numbers regarding the original loan amount and the loan
reduction amount, was $6,840 from that double inclusion.
271. Applying
,

,
,

.

the

210,600

2018

statute

“passive

appreciation”

formula

,

36,500 , produces .6172 times 174,100, which equals 107,458.05, half of

which is 53,729.02. That plus $18,464.27 active appreciation equals $72,193.29.
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during the marriage by $10,000. Applying the Stevens formula,
$180,000 of the $200,000 appreciation would be deemed marital,
notwithstanding that virtually none of the mortgage principal was
paid down during the marriage. Assume that the mortgage at the
time of the marriage had been $10,000, and that because of the
terms, the same amount was paid down as in the above
hypothetical. In the case of the $10,000 mortgage, only $20,000 of
the same appreciation would be marital, though the payment on
the mortgage was identical. Is that fair?272
Yes, actually it does appear fair, assuming correct application of the Kaaa
formula273 and some further flushing out of the missing hypothetical facts. This nonintuitive observation occurs because, as shown above, even the flawed Kaaa formula
tends to work fine in “good-investment” scenarios.
To flush out how these useful examples actually hurt rather than help the
authors’ argument, one must add some missing but determinable facts. The examples
state the amount of the loans and the amount of principal paid, but they fail to state
the interest rates on the loans, the payments on the loans, or the timing of the
payments. Because those multiple variables are each a function of the others, a large
number of facts could fill in the details. The assumed four-year marriage constrains
the possible facts. It results in very rapid house appreciation at a 27.78% NAI rate,
which suggests a period of high inflation, which in turn suggests a time of high
interest rates.
Consider a plausible set of facts based on mortgage rates in the early 1980’s:
Loan 1: The $90,000 loan was initially for 170 months,274 was
incurred just prior to the marriage, and bore a 14.95% interest
rate.275 Monthly payments would be $1,275.00 and $79,981.81276
principal would remain in 48 months, at the date of separation.
Loan 2: The alternative $10,000 loan also bore a 14.95% interest
rate, but had only 48 months remaining. Monthly payments would
be $278.07.
The house appreciation – from $100,000 to $300,000 – would be at a rate
of 27.78% over the 48 months, nearly twice the cost of capital. Loan 1 is a verygood-investment scenario with high leverage, while Loan 2 is a very-goodinvestment with low leverage. Importantly, both are the exact examples used in the
2013 article, but with plausible essential facts included.
The following two tables illustrate the various state formulas results using
the flushed-out Florida Family Law Section examples:

272. Manz, supra note 3 at 39.
273. The quoted language mistakenly fails to subtract the remaining $80,000 debt, which results in a
$100,000 marital asset rather than $180,000.
274. Admittedly an odd term, but not at all unreasonable. It is a little over 14 years.
275. From 1981 to 1982, average rates on 30-year loans in the U.S. exceeded 16%. Information on 15year loans is not available; however, 10-year treasury notes yielded over 17% in 1981, which suggests the
posited rate for a 14-year loan is plausible.
276. Using an HP10Bii calculator, set N=48, I/YR=14.95, PV = 90,000, PMT = -1,275, mode = END.
The FV is $79,981.81.
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Table 12: $90,000 Loan/4-Year Marriage277
= $100,000;
= $90,000; 14-year loan @
Non-Owner
14.95% NAI; $1275 payment ($637.50 per
Spouse
spouse);
= $80,000 ($10,000 principal
paid); end mode.
= $300,000 (27.782% NAI return); equity
ROI
= $220,000.
California Moore/New Mexico/Florida
15,000
-41.637%
Kentucky/Delaware/Virginia/Georgia/Miss 55,000
ouri/Maryland/North Carolina
27.725%
Nevada/Maine/Minnesota
95,000
50.747%
Florida Kaaa
55,000
27.725%
Texas/Louisiana/Idaho
5,000
-152.778%
Pennsylvania/Colorado
100,000
52.812%
Illinois Transmutation
110,000
56.612%
Economic Reimbursement Formula
55,071.5727.7
82%
Table 13: $10,000 Loan/4-Year Marriage278
= $100,000;
= $10,000; 4-year loan @
14.95% NAI; $278.05 payment ($139.03 per
spouse);
= $0 ($10,000 principal paid); end
mode.
= $300,000 (27.782% NAI return); equity =
$300,000.
California Moore/New Mexico/Florida
Kentucky/Delaware/Virginia/Georgia/Missouri/
Maryland/North Carolina
Nevada/ Maine/Minnesota
Florida Kaaa
Texas/Louisiana/Idaho
Pennsylvania/Colorado

OwnerSpouse

ROI
205,000
57.181%
165,000
50.156%
115,000
38.168%
165,000
50.156%
215,000
58.707%
120,000
39.605%
110,000
36.661%
164,928.43
50.142%

NonOwner
Spouse

OwnerSpouse

ROI
15,000
37.395%
15,000
37.395%
15,000
37.395%
15,000
37.395%
5,000
-15.463%
100,000
109.777%

ROI
205,000
19.488%
205,000
19.488%
205,000
19.488%
205,000
19.488%
215,000
20.725%
120,000
5.600%

277. See supra note 210 for definitions; see supra Table 1 for formulas.
278. See supra note 210 for definitions; see supra Table 1 for formulas.
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Illinois Transmutation
Economic Reimbursement Formula

110,000
113.163%
12,010.35
27.782%

110,000
3.346%
208,989.65
19.864%

Florida, California, New Mexico, Texas, Louisiana, Idaho, Pennsylvania,
Colorado, and Illinois treat the two situations exactly the same, at least in terms of
the amount received: each involved $10,000 of principal payments during the
marriage. But the two loans are vastly different and thus produce a vastly different
return on investment. One has monthly payments of $1,275.00 and the other of only
$278.05. Otherwise, the loans have the same number of payments and the same
interest rate, plus the houses which secure the loans have the same values and
appreciate at the same rates. Examining the examples – as the 2013 article did279 –
by examining only principal payments results in them appearing the same; however,
that is surely the incorrect viewpoint. Would anyone view $1,275 for 48 months – a
total of $61,200 – the same as $278.05 for 48 months – a total of $13,346.40 as the
same? One would hope not; however, at least nine states do.
Recall the common reason given for not considering the loan interest: it
offsets the use of the house. But in these two examples, the house is exactly the same.
Economic common sense suggests the offset, if any, should be the same in both
examples; however, because the examples involve very different interest payments,
identical offsets cannot yield the same result. Thus the examples used to justify the
new Florida formula actually illustrate its central flaw: the failure to consider interest
and timing.
Notice, as well, although the old Kaaa formula has serious flaws, the very
examples used to attack it actually demonstrate the formula can be reasonable. The
non-owner-spouse return in the first example (Table 12) is virtually identical whether
one uses the Kaaa formula or the economic return formula. In the second example
(Table 13), the Kaaa formula is arguably high, but within a reasonable margin of
error.280 Clearly, while the new Florida formula improves on the old Kaaa formula
in many, if not most scenarios, in some cases, it actually produces an absurd result.
One could posit a longer marriage and thus lower payments and lower interest rates
for each loan as well as for the house appreciation; however, the conclusions would
mostly281 be the same: the new Florida formula treats very different situations the
same.
iv. Two Other Comments on the Florida Statute
The 2018 Florida statute has two noteworthy provisions not illustrated by
the examples. The statute describes the portion of appreciation that becomes a marital
asset by using a fraction of the total non-active appreciation:

279. Manz, supra note 3, at 39.
280. The dollar return is 24.978% higher than what the economic reimbursement formula produces—
within the earlier-posited 30% acceptable margin.
281. The author chose the interest rates so that the Kaaa result would be reasonable. In other examples
involving the same principal payments but a longer or shorter marriage, the Kaaa formula diverges from
economic consistency.
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II) The coverture fraction must consist of a numerator, defined
as the total payment of principal from marital funds of all notes
and mortgages secured by the property during the marriage,
and a denominator, defined as the value of the subject real property
on the date of the marriage, the date of acquisition of the property,
or the date the property was encumbered by the first note and
mortgage on which principal was paid from marital funds,
whichever is later.282
The highlighted words are worthy of special comment. Not only does the
fraction include principal paid on acquisition debt owed by the owner-spouse at the
time of the marriage, but it also includes principal paid on home-equity indebtedness
incurred during the marriage. The parties could devote the proceeds of such debt to
home improvements; however, such use would involve active appreciation, dealt
with elsewhere in the statute. Thus, including it in the passive appreciation formula
would double count it.
Or, the parties could devote the proceeds to some other use unrelated to the
house: perhaps the acquisition of a boat, or furniture, a vacation, or college expenses
for a child. The objects of such non-house related uses would be marital assets or
expenses, but they would have nothing to do with the house. Counting such principal
payments as part of the passive appreciation fraction also effectively counts them
twice.
A well-informed owner-spouse should think carefully about securing
marital loans with his/her separate home: doing so would likely result in a lower
interest rate for the loan, but it would also convert a portion of his separate property
to marital, even if the loan had nothing to do with the home.
Another significant passage in the Florida statute is:
(V) The court shall apply the formula specified in this
subparagraph unless a party shows circumstances sufficient to
establish that application of the formula would be inequitable
under the facts presented.283
As shown above, the formula tends to work well whenever the house
appreciates about twice the cost of capital; however, in all other scenarios, the
formula shortchanges the non-owner-spouse. Litigants should consider requesting
the court to use the economic reimbursement formula in such cases.
c. Kentucky Delaware/Virginia/Georgia/ Missouri/Maryland/North
Carolina
These seven states’ formula has some good points, but also some serious
flaws. It produces an acceptable result in most “Good-Investment” scenarios
involving house appreciation approximately twice the cost of capital;284 however, it

282. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.075(6)(a)1.c.(II) (2018) ) (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the
26th Legis., 2019) (emphasis added).
283. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.075(6)(a)1.c.(V)
284. See supra Table 8 (low-leverage/good investment) in which the non-owner-spouse return is
9.797% compared to 10% house appreciation.
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arguably overcompensates the non-owner-spouse whenever the leverage reaches
extremely high levels.285
The formula also produces an acceptable result in most “Neutral” scenarios
involving house appreciation approximately equal to the cost of capital; however,
the lower the leverage, the less well it works. As Table 10 shows, with 95% leverage
and a 20-year marriage, the 4.664% non-owner return approximates the 5% house
appreciation. Per Table 4, with 80% leverage and a 20-year marriage, the 3.753%
non-owner return is reasonably close to the 5% house appreciation. But, in Table 7,
with 20% leverage, the non-owner spouse return is a mere 1.063%, substantially
below the house appreciation. Logically, the longer the marriage, the lower the
average leverage and thus the less-fair the formula will be.
Unfortunately, the formula shortchanges a non-owner in all “Bad
Investment” scenarios, with lower-leverage scenarios being the most serious. Table
6 (20% leverage) shows a negative 2.705% non-owner return compared to 3.25%
house appreciation, while Table 3 (80% leverage) shows a negative 0.286% return,
and Table 9 (95% leverage) a 0.562% return. Conversely, in such cases, it
overcompensates the owner-spouse and thus rewards the bad investment. The greater
the leverage, the more serious the over-compensation to the owner.
Because the formula focuses only on principal payments, it is subject to
manipulation, as demonstrated below in Tables 14-15: owner-spouses have a bizarre
incentive to pay less principal with marital/community assets and non-owners will
seek to have more paid.
d. Nevada
Nevada courts described its formula as a small modification of the
California formula. Its impact, however, is a substantial improvement over the
California formula. It produces an appropriate result in all “Neutral-Investment”
scenarios, where the house appreciation approximates the cost of capital. It
overcompensates the non-owner-spouse in all “Good-Investment” scenarios. In
comparison, the California formula produced an acceptable result in those cases.
Unfortunately, the Nevada formula undercompensates the non-owner in all “BadInvestment” scenarios; however, it is a substantial improvement over the California
formula in those cases. To its credit, the formula avoids the manipulation scenario
illustrated in Tables 14-15; however, in the extreme examples below (Tables 20 and
21), the formula produces what is arguably a grossly indefensible result.
e. Texas/Louisiana/Idaho
Because the Texas/Louisiana/Idaho formula merely reimburses for
principal payments without reference to house appreciation, it consistently produces
a negative 11.834% return for the non-owner spouse. That assumes a 20-year
marriage and a 30-year 5% mortgage note at the date-of-marriage. Neither the
leverage amount, the loan amount, nor the house appreciation affect this return.

285. See supra Table 11 (extremely-high-leverage) in which the non-owner-spouse return is 13.496%,
which is significantly more than the 10% house appreciation; supra Table 5 using 80% leverage, produces
a 12.582% non-owner-spouse return compared to 10% house appreciation. Clearly, the higher the
leverage, the less-well the formula works in a good-investment scenario.
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The length of the marriage and the internal loan rate, however, each
significantly affect the results. A 10-year marriage, with a 30-year 5% loan produces
a negative 33.353% non-owner return (Table 2), while a 30-year marriage produces
a negative 5.01% return (Table 3). Thus, the longer the marriage, the less
unreasonable the formula.
Changing the interest rate has similar effects. Using a 10% 30-year loan and
a 20-year marriage, the non-owner spouse receives a negative 31.293%286 return.
But, with a 2% 30-year loan and a 20-year marriage, the non-owner receives a
negative 4.249%287 return. Thus, the lower the loan interest rate, the less
unreasonable the formula. A high interest loan and a short marriage would produce
a very poor return for a non-owner: negative 116.209288 for a ten-year marriage with
a 10% 30-year loan.
f. Pennsylvania/Colorado
The Pennsylvania/Colorado formula is an inconsistent mess. In highleverage/bad-investment scenarios (Table 1), it shortchanges the non-owner with a
negative 1.233% return. This corresponds with an arguably higher-than-deserved
owner return, which will tend to reward bad behavior. The problem worsens the
shorter the marriage (Table 2), but lessens with a longer marriage (Table 3). In lowleverage/bad-investment situations, that problem disappears, but it arguably overcompensate the non-owner (Table 6) with a 10.873% return compared to 3.25%
house appreciation. With high-leverage/neutral-investments, it produces a
reasonable non-owner return (Tables 4 and 10), but with low leverage, the non-owner
return becomes excessive: 15.447% compared to 5% house appreciation. In goodinvestment scenarios (Tables 5, 8, and 11) the return to the non-owner is consistently
excessive: 14.887% (80% leverage), 24.165% (20% leverage), and 13.658% (95%
leverage), particularly so, the lower the leverage. This will tend to punish good
behavior because the owner-return is consistently lower.
g. Illinois
Transmutation has fewer adherents than it once did. As noted above, even
Illinois, one of the later users, effectively changed it for separate secured homes for
which marital assets serviced the debt.289 Nevertheless, as the above charts show, in
high-leverage, bad or neutral-investment scenarios, transmutation produces
reasonable solutions, significantly superior to the much more complicated formulas
used elsewhere.

286. For example, a 10% 30-year 80,000 loan would have payments of 702.06, or 351.03 per spouse.
After 20 years, the amount due would be 53,125.49. The non-owner would receive 13,437.26 (half the
principal paid). That produces a -31.293% return. The result would not vary by the loan amount, the
degree of leverage, or the house appreciation.
287. For example, a 2% 30-year 80,000 loan would have payments of 295.70, or 147.85 per spouse.
After 20 years, the amount due would be 32,136.12. The non-owner would receive 23,931.94 (half the
principal paid). That produces a -4.249% return.
288. For example, a 10% 30-year 80,000 loan would have payments of 702.06, or 351.03 per spouse.
After 10 years, the amount due would be 72,750.42. The non-owner would receive 3,624.79 (half the
principal paid). That produces a -116.209% return.
289. See Feldman and Fleck, supra note 41.
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C. A Focus on Timing: A Surprising Result and Chance to Manipulate
The following two tables present economically identical hypotheticals, with
a very small factual change and a surprising, counter-intuitive result. An about-toseparate couple must decide whether to use marital/community funds to pay-off the
owner-spouse’s secured loan. Intuitively, one might think a non-owner spouse would
say “Heck no, I want my money . . . you pay off your own loan.” Similarly, one
might think an owner-spouse would seek to have his/her loan paid during the
marriage using marital funds. The opposite, however, is true.
Consider this basic example with two variations:
Example 10: Pre-marriage, A owns a house with a $100,000 fair
market value subject to $80,000 secured debt with 30 years of
monthly interest-only payments remaining at a 5% nominal rate.
During the marriage, A and B reside in the house, which
appreciates at 5% NAI for twenty years, at which point they
divorce.
At their wedding reception, the couple receives an $80,000 gift,
which is a marital asset/community property. They invest the
$80,000 in a long-term non-taxable290 fixed account earning 5%
paid monthly. They use the investment interest to pay the monthly
loan interest.
1.
Per Table 14, they then use the remaining $80,000
investment to pay the $80,000 loan principal the day before they
separate in twenty years; or,
2.
Per Table 15, they do not use the $80,000 investment to
pay the $80,000 principal; instead, they divide the $80,000
equally.
Because everything either earns, accrues, or appreciates at 5% NAI, the
economic results are the same. In each instance, title to the home is in A’s name and
he/she bears the risk of loss, but the parties share appreciation per the state formula.
In each case, the investment and the house appreciate at the same rate. Tax
consequences are irrelevant. Logically, the results should be the same; but, they often
are not. Texas, Louisiana, Idaho, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Colorado and Illinois treat
the two decisions the same.
But, California, Florida, New Mexico, Kentucky, Delaware, Virginia,
Georgia, Missouri, Maryland, and North Carolina do not. In those states, the nonowner-spouse should be eager to use marital assets to pay the owner-spouse’s
separate debt: the opposite of what one might expect. Also, the owner-spouse should
resist paying his/her separate secured debt using marital assets.
This illustration postpones the decision to pay principal until the day before
the separation; however, if the couple were to use the entire $80,000 to pay the entire
debt at the wedding reception, the results would be the same in all jurisdictions. That
would be true of any day between the wedding and the separation. The key is
payment during the marriage: it typically favors the non-owner-spouse, not the

290. The example assumes no tax consequences. Adding tax consequences would change the numbers,
but not the point: a one-day change in principal payment makes a huge difference.
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owner-spouse, as one might intuitively believe. Any formula that makes this counterintuitive distinction is inherently flawed, which is the point of this article. The flaw
occurs because those formulas fail to consider the interest as a payment.
Table 14: High-Leverage/Neutral-Investment/Late-Pay-Principal291
= $100,000;
= $80,000; 30-year interest only NonOwnerloan @ 5% NAI; $333.33 payment ($166.67 for Owner
Spouse
each spouse);
= $0 ($80,000 principal paid just Spouse
before divorce); end mode.
= $271,264.03 (5.00% NAI return; 5.11%
EFF); equity = $271,264.03.
Wedding gift of $80,000 invested at 5% NAI. Used
to pay principal and interest. Remainder =
$0,000.
California Moore/New Mexico/Florida
108,505.61 162,758.42
Kentucky/Delaware/Virginia/Georgia/Missouri/
108,505.61 162,758.42
Maryland/North Carolina
Nevada/Maine/Minnesota
108,505.61 162,758.42
Florida Kaaa
108,505.61 162,758.42
Texas/Louisiana/Idaho
40,000
256,202.85
Pennsylvania/Colorado
85,632.02
175,509.56
Illinois Transmutation
135,632.02 135,632.02
Economic Reimbursement Formula
108,506.98 162,757.05
Table 15: High-Leverage/Neutral-Investment/Never-Pay-Principal292
= $100,000;
= $80,000; 30-year interest only NonOwnerloan @ 5% NAI; $333.33 payment ($166.67 per Owner
Spouse
spouse);
= $80,000 (00 principal paid); end Spouse
mode.
= $271,264.03 (5.00% NAI return; 5.11%
EFF); equity = $191,264.03.
Wedding gift of $80,000 invested at 5% NAI. Used
to pay interest. Remainder = $80,000.
California Moore/New Mexico/Florida
40,000
231,264.03
Kentucky/Delaware/Virginia/Georgia/Missouri/
40,000
231,264.03
Maryland/North Carolina
Nevada/ Maine/Minnesota
108,505.61 162,757.05
Florida Kaaa
40,000
231,264.03
Texas/Louisiana/Idaho
40,000
231,264.03
Pennsylvania/Colorado
125,632.02 145,632.01
Illinois Transmutation
135,632.02 135,632.02
Economic Reimbursement Formula
108,506.98 162,757.05

291. See supra note 210 for definitions.
292. See supra note 210 for definitions.
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By not paying A’s separate debt with the $80,000 wedding gift, B receives
$68,505.61 less under both the California and Kentucky formulas! That absurd result
should be sufficient to disabuse use of the formulas.
D: Back to the Prelude Example
As Tables 14 and 15 demonstrate, principal payments during marriage can
favor the non-owner-spouse in most states. That realization prompts a reexamination of the three basic examples and various permutations. The results are
surprising.
Consider how a well-informed, willing-to-deceive, non-owner spouse in
Example 7293 might act if he/she decides to seek a divorce, but has not yet told ownerspouse. Suppose, however, the parties have $40,488.70 in available
marital/community funds. If non-owner does nothing, he/she will receive half of the
funds plus the amount listed in Table 1, which produces Table 16:
Table 16: High-Leverage/Bad-Investment294
= $100,000;
= $80,000; 30-year loan @ 5%
NonNAI; $429.46 payment ($214.73 per spouse);
Owner
= $40,488.70 ($39,511.30 principal paid); end
Spouse
mode.
= $191,385.85 (3.25% NAI return); equity =
$150,897.15.
Other MA = $40,488.70.
California Moore/New Mexico/Florida
58,054.46
Kentucky/Delaware/Virginia/Georgia/Missouri/
Maryland/North Carolina
Nevada/ Maine/Minnesota
Florida Kaaa
Texas/Louisiana/Idaho
Pennsylvania/Colorado
Illinois Transmutation
Economic Reimbursement Formula

OwnerSpouse

133,331.39

70,336.88

121,048.97

76,555.54

114,830.31

55,309.99
40,000.00
65,937.28
95,692.93
92,699.55

136,075.86
151,385.85
125,448.57
95,692.92
98,686.30

But, suppose non-owner uses the $40,488.70 marital funds to pay owner’s
separate debt. One might believe he/she would receive less; however, the opposite
often occurs:
Table 17: High-Leverage/Bad-Investment295
= $100,000;
= $80,000; 30-year loan @ 5%
NonNAI; $429.46 payment ($214.73 per spouse);
Owner
= $0 ($80,000 principal paid); end mode.
Spouse

293. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 210 for definitions, see supra Table 1 for formulas.
295. See supra note 210 for definitions, see supra Table 1 for formulas.

OwnerSpouse
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= $191,385.85 (3.25% NAI return); equity =
$191,385.85.
$40,488.70 debt paid prior to separation.
California Moore/New Mexico/Florida
Kentucky/Delaware/Virginia/Georgia/Missouri/
Maryland/North Carolina
Nevada/ Maine/Minnesota
Florida Kaaa
Texas/Louisiana/Idaho
Pennsylvania/Colorado
Illinois Transmutation
Economic Reimbursement Formula
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76,554.34

114,831.51

76,554.34

114,831.51

76,555.54
76,554.34
40,000
65,937.28
95,692.93
92,699.55

114,830.31
114,831.51
151,385.85
125,448.57
95,692.92
98,686.30

No change occurs in Nevada, Texas, Louisiana, Idaho, Pennsylvania,
Colorado, or under the Economic Reimbursement Formula. Kaaa produces a
substantial increased return for the non-owner-spouse; however, because it is no
longer applicable, the following analysis eliminates it.
Focus on the “California” and “Kentucky” formulas. California results in a
$18,499.78 increase, while Kentucky results in a smaller $6,218.66 increase.
Because half the $40,488.70 would inure to the non-owner in any event, using it to
pay the owner’s separate debt produces the unexpected windfall. This occurs
whenever the house appreciates, even by a penny! It should not occur, of course, but
it does because the formulas are inherently flawed: they focus on principal payments
and equity rather than all payments of principal and interest.
Indeed, if the house appreciation is sufficient, the non-owner-spouse should
consider borrowing funds to pay the owner’s separate debt. Any new debt replacing
the old would continue to be separate debt, which would result in no change;
however, the non-owner-spouse has two options to counter that. First, he/she could
stipulate the new debt is marital rather than separate. Logically, a less-than-fully
informed owner-spouse would readily agree. Or, he/she could borrow the funds over
time and pay off the debt in a way that the process did not appear to be re-financing.
Applying the same analysis to the High-Leverage/Good-Investment
scenario produces an even greater manipulative opportunity. With the same
assumption of $40,488.70 in marital assets available to pay the debt, doing so results
in a $128,107.70 increase to the non-owner-spouse under the California formula and
$43,053.24 under the Kentucky formula, as shown in Table 19. Table 18 lists the
results from Table 5 plus the shared $40,488.70.
Table 18: High-Leverage/Good-Investment/Keep Marital Funds296
= $100,000;
= $80,000; 30-year loan
Non-Owner
Owner@ 5% NAI; $429.46 payment ($214.73 per
Spouse
Spouse
spouse);
= $40,488.70 ($39,511.30
principal paid); end mode.

296. See supra note 210 for definitions; see supra Table 1 for formulas.
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= $732,807.36 (10.00% NAI return);
equity = $692,318.66.
Other MA = $40,488.70.
California Moore/New Mexico/Florida
Kentucky/Delaware/Virginia/Georgia/
Missouri/Maryland/North Carolina

165,015.21
250,069.70

567,792.15
482,737.66

Table 19 shows a dramatic increase to the non-owner-spouse resulting from
the separate debt payment with marital funds. Describing this result as anything other
than absurd is difficult: using $40,488.70 marital funds generates an immediate profit
to the non-owner-spouse of $128,107.73 in California, New Mexico, and Florida.
That amounts to a 532.81% immediate return.297 That it is inherent to the widelyused formulas should be disturbing to residents of those states.
Table 19: High-Leverage/Good-Investment/Use Marital Funds to Pay
Debt298
= $100,000;
= $80,000; 30-year loan
Non-Owner
Owner@ 5% NAI; $429.46 payment ($214.73 per
Spouse
Spouse
spouse);
= $40,488.70 ($39,511.30
principal paid); end mode.
= $732,807.36 (10.00% NAI return);
equity = $732,807.36.
$40,488.70 debt paid prior to separation.
California Moore/New Mexico/Florida
293,122.94
439,684.42
Kentucky/Delaware/Virginia/Georgia/
293,122.94
439,684.42
Missouri/Maryland/North Carolina
In the alternative, suppose the $40,488.70 of marital/community funds do
not exist and non-owner has no opportunity to borrow them; however, suppose she
has $40,488.70 of her own separate funds. Logically, a spouse who is seriously
considering divorce would scoff at using his/her separate property to pay the other
spouse’s separate debt. But, consider what happens under these flawed formulas.
If non-owner does nothing, he/she receives $185,259.56299 under the
California formula and $270,314.05300 under the Kentucky formula. But if he/she
uses separate property to pay the debt, he/she receives $293,122.94 under both
formulas, the same as in Table 19. At that point – ignoring any possible future return
on her separate property as well as any future house appreciation – the immediate
separate property return is 166.4% under the California formula and a more modest,
but still shocking, 56.33% under the Kentucky formula. Those returns are immediate
297. Non-owner’s $20,244.35 investment account share turns into an extra $128,107.73 house share.
298. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
299. See supra Table 18 ($165,015.21 (which treats the $40,488.70 as marital) plus an extra
$20,244.35 (half of $40,488.70) because in the revised example the funds are non-owner’s separate
property).
300. See supra Table 18 ($250,069.70 (which treats the $40,488.70 as marital) plus an extra
$20,244.35 (half of $40,488.70) because in the revised example the funds are non-owner’s separate
property).

350

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 49; No. 2

and will surely fall over time because the house appreciation will not keep up with
them; however, if she expects the divorce within a year or two, the plan will often be
lucrative.
This manipulation opportunity is likely an unintended consequence of
flawed formulas in the states considered. Nevertheless, it is something lawyers
should consider as long as those formulas remain. Granted, deceiving a soon-to-be
ex-spouse is morally suspect, but a 532.81% one-day return is unquestionably
tempting. Because the manipulation opportunity involves plausible facts, states using
those formulas should replace them.
E: Two Extreme, but Helpful Examples
Consider two extreme examples which further illustrate illogical results in
many formulas:
Example 11: At the date-of-marriage, A owns a $100,000 house
subject to a mortgage securing a 30-year $100,000 5% loan with
monthly payments of $536.82. The spouses live in the house and
divorce after twenty years. The house does not appreciate.
Example 12: At the date-of-marriage, A owns a $100,000 house
subject to a mortgage securing a 30-year $100,000 5% loan with
monthly payments of $536.82. The spouses live in the house and
divorce after twenty years. The house appreciates at a 10% return.
As shown in Table 20, Example 11 illustrates how all examined formulas
protect the owner-spouse in a “Bad Investment” scenario. Instead of suffering the
full impact of the bad investment, the owner shifts a significant portion to the nonowner-spouse. This owner-subsidy would occur at lower leverage levels, though to
a lesser extent.
In contrast, as shown in Table 21, Example 12 illustrates how all the
formulas provide the owner-spouse with a strong return in a “Good-Investment”
scenario, with the Pennsylvania, Texas, Nevada, and Kaaa formulas being
particularly high.
Why is this significant? Moral hazard is the answer. The owner-spouse
receives significant downside protection from his Example 11 bad investment
choice, but does not suffer a concomitant amount on the Example 12 upside in many
states. The examples also illustrate other important anomalies:
 The Kentucky formula both subsidizes the owner-spouse in “BadInvestment” scenarios and then punishes the owner-spouse in
“Good-Investment” scenarios with extremely high leverage.
Neither result is logical. Both results should be the opposite.
 The Nevada formula, which often performs acceptably well,
grossly shortchanges the non-owner in the “Good-Investment”
Example 12/Table 21 scenario with 100% leverage. From the nonowner’s point of view, all payments involving the house would
have been marital, but the owner would receive almost 27 times as
much as she would. To compound that harsh result, the non-owner
would share equally with the owner-spouse if the house failed to
appreciate at all, per Example 11/Table 20.
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Table 20: 100% Leverage/Very-Bad-Investment301
= $100,000;
= $100,000; 30-year loan @
Non5% NAI; $536.82 payment ($268.41 per
Owner
spouse);
= $50,612.93 ($49,387.07 principal
Spouse
paid); end mode.
= $100,000.00 (0.00% NAI return); equity
= $49,387.07.
ROI
California Moore/New Mexico/Florida
24,693.54
-11.835%
Kentucky/Delaware/Virginia/Georgia/
24,693.54
Missouri/Maryland/North Carolina
-11.835%
Nevada/ Maine/Minnesota
24,693.54
-11.835%
Florida Kaaa
24,693.54
-11.835%

OwnerSpouse

ROI
24,693.53
-11.835%
24,693.53
-11.835%
24,693.53
-11.835%
24,693.53
-11.835%

Texas/Louisiana/Idaho

24,693.54
-11.835%

24,693.53
-11.835%

Pennsylvania/Colorado

0
-100%
24,693.54
-11.835%
64,419.36
0%

49,387.07
-2.796%
24,693.53
-11.835%
-15,032.29
-100+%

Illinois Transmutation
Economic Reimbursement Formula

Table 21: 100% Leverage/Very-Good-Investment302
= $100,000;
= $100,000; 30-year loan @
Non5% NAI; $536.82 payment ($268.41 per spouse);
Owner
= $50,612.93 ($49,387.07 principal paid); end
Spouse
mode.
= $732,807.36 (10.00% NAI return); equity =
$682,194.43.
ROI
California Moore/New Mexico/Florida
180,956.04
9.074%
Kentucky/Delaware/Virginia/Georgia/Missouri/ 341,097.22
Maryland/North Carolina
13.830%
Nevada/ Maine/Minnesota
24,694.04
-11.835%
Florida Kaaa
24,693.54
-11.835%
Texas/Louisiana/Idaho
24,693.54
-11.835%

301. See supra note 210 for definitions; see supra Table 1 for formulas.
302. See supra note 210 for definitions; see supra Table 1 for formulas.

OwnerSpouse

ROI
501,238.39
16.545%
341,097.21
13.830%
657,500.39
18.401%
657,500.89
18.401%
657,500.89
18.401%
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Pennsylvania/Colorado
Illinois Transmutation
Economic Reimbursement Formula

0
-100.000%
341,097.22
13.830%
203,822.19
10.000%
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682,194.43
18.650%
341,097.21
13.830%
478,372.24
16.221%

IV. A PROPOSED STATUTE
Consider the following statute:
1.
If either spouse uses marital funds to pay nonmarital
debts of either spouse, the benefitting spouse owes as reimbursement to the other,303 in the event of dissolution, an amount
equal to the present, after-tax304 value305 of one-half the amounts
paid. The same rule applies in the event of the death of either
spouse. Such debts include principal and interest306 on nonmarital
debts, whether secured or unsecured. For purposes of this
subsection, such nonmarital debts do not include amounts paid for
routine maintenance, including insurance, of nonmarital assets.
Routine maintenance obligations include those which are
insubstantial in relation to the value of the affected property and
which do not materially enhance the value of the property. The
Court, acting in equity, may reduce the re-imbursement obligation
to the extent the benefitting spouse contributed or used nonmarital
assets for the common benefit of the spouses during the marriage
or for the separate benefit of the other spouse.
2.
If marital funds or efforts enhance the value of a
nonmarital asset, the enhanced asset becomes a marital asset in
part, the marital portion being a percentage equal to the amount of
the enhancement divided by the fair market value at the time of the
enhancement. General maintenance efforts or expenditures, by
either spouse, which do not materially increase the value of the
assets involved are not enhancements even if they prevent
deterioration.
303. An alternative would require re-imbursement of the entire amount (rather than half) to the active
mass of marital assets, subject to equitable, rather than equal, division.
304. The after-tax cost of property taxes and interest is relevant if a spouse deducted the items.
Whether they file jointly or separately would not be relevant.
305. The present value would be the time-of-payment value, which would involve a future value
calculation. The appropriate interest rate should include a factor for liquidity (approximately 3%) plus a
factor for past inflation. A risk factor is probably unwise. A possible measure would be the TIPS rate plus
the TIPS inflation adjustments for the periods involved. This would be low compared to actual market
rates, but it would be a fair measure and would be preferable to the use of static dollars.
306. Reimbursement for principal payments is non-controversial. Reimbursement for interest may be
controversial; however, a non-owner-spouse who paid the obligations would pay interest. Similarly, if
he/she borrowed separately, he/she would pay interest. And, if he/she did not use marital assets, those
assets would have produced utility in the form of earnings or a higher standard of living. Thus the
opportunity cost is relevant. In times of inflation, it could be substantial, if not more significant than the
principal.
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3.
If nonmarital funds enhance or maintain the value of a
marital asset, the enhanced or maintained asset retains its character
as a marital asset. However, the contributing spouse may seek an
extra portion of marital assets, in case of a dissolution, in an
amount equal to the present value of the funds expended. The court
shall award such an extra portion if the equities justify it.
V. CONCLUSION
States use a variety of formulas to classify and to divide encumbered
separate property whenever marital/community funds service the secured debt. Of
the nineteen considered, none consider interest and none adequately consider timing.
As a result, all formulas considered often produce inequitable results. Several state
formulas are easily manipulated in plausible scenarios. The problems stem from two
sources:
1.
2.

The mistaken idea that interest on a home loan correlates
to the rental value of the property.
The mistaken idea that equity is an asset.

To resolve the nearly universal problems, states should adopt an economic
approach: one focusing on the timing of both interest and principal payments.

